Sect. 159Possibility and Permission of SinPossibility and Permission of Sin

I. Sin is possible to creatures only, and its possibility arises from the necessary imperfection of finite free will. This is such that the creatures do not necessarily will even their own good as pointed out by reason; much less are they under physical necessity to will the good of God as prescribed by Divine Law. A creature naturally impeccable is just as much an impossibility as a creature naturally possessing supernatural grace. By supernatural means, the possibility is, as a matter of fact, excluded from the Blessed in heaven. By the special grace, called confirmation in grace,” it can be so paralyzed and subdued that its passing into acts is completely prevented. Sanctifying grace alone, however, leaves the power of sinning intact, because it merely gives to free will a higher power without disabling its natural powers.

II. The possibility of sin is attributable to God only inasmuch as He has not destroyed free will, or made good the deficiencies naturally arising from its finiteness. God is not the direct cause; He directly wills neither sin nor its possibility, but He “permits” both. Human nature is so constituted that desires are often excited in man which cannot be satisfied without sin. Yet this inclination to sin is not a direct and positive tendency like the inclination to good; we can only will evil under the false appearance of good. Hence the evil inclination does not make the Author of nature to be also the author of sin. As a matter of fact, He suppressed the evil inclination in the angels and the first man in a supernatural manner, leaving only the bare possibility of sin with fullest liberty to avoid it. The inclination now existing is a penalty of the first sin committed with absolute liberty. God cannot positively lead His creatures into sin as He leads them into good works; to do so would be against His Holiness (supra, § 89; cf. §§ 85, 116; James 1:13).

When God permits sin, this permission is an act of Divine Sovereignty, and consequently entirely different from a similar permission given by creatures. The Sovereign of the Universe is not bound to prevent every sin, because He can make every sin subservient to the general order of the Universe; yet, although not so bound, He could prevent sin if He so willed, and hence no sin happens without His permission. He may permit new sins as a punishment for previous ones, or particular sins as contributing to the realization of certain ends. And, lastly, the rebellious will of the sinner can be so turned to account as to become a means towards the wise ends of His Sovereign Master.

The creature is the first and principal cause of sin as such—for God in nowise moves the creature to sin—and by committing sin the creature turns itself away from the law of God and from the Divine influence for good. Between the sins actually committed by the “second causes assuming the right of the First Cause,” there exists a most remarkable concatenation. The sins of man all originate in the sin of the first man; the sin of the first man originated in the sin of the angels, and this again in the sin of one superior angel. Wherefore, in order fully to fathom the sins of this world, it is necessary to ascend to the very beginning and to the very summit of creation. This “first cause of evil,” establishing a realm against the realm of the All-good God, is at the bottom of the heathen fiction of Ahriman, the principle of Evil, and of the summum malum of the Manichæans. See Stapleton, De Justificatione, lib. xi.; Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiæ, lib. ii.; St. Thomas, l 2. q. 79.