Sect. 155General Notions of Evil and SinGeneral Notions of Evil and Sin
I. 1. EVERY substance is in itself good; it becomes bad only when it is itself deprived of some perfection or when it deprives another substance of some perfection. Hence evil is the privation of some good, or a corruption of good. It is nothing positive, but the negation of a positive perfection. However, evil mostly consists of some positive disposition opposed to the perfection of the subject, which disposition is then evil in as far as it implies the negatives of perfection. As evil is only an accident, it must exist in a substance as its subject. Again, since it connotes a deficiency in perfection, it can only exist in finite and changeable beings. In these, however, the possibility of evil is connatural with the changeableness consequent upon their origin out of nothing; as no definite grade of perfection is essential to them, so the amount they actually receive is capable of decrease or increase. In the case of man, his composition of mind and matter necessarily exposes him to certain evils or imperfections.
2. The cause of evil is not something evil in itself. On the contrary, evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good, and aims at some good object. In bodily evils this is manifest; the causes which inflict bodily suffering do so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves, but which come into conflict with other forces. The evils arising from free actions are due to a good but misapplied principle. Sin, in particular, is possible only because it appears to the sinner as a subjective good. Hence the axiom: Evil is caused by good (causa mali bonum). Evil has, however, no efficient but rather a deficient cause; it owes its existence either to the defective action of a positive cause or to defective resistance to opposing influences.
3. From a theological point of view, evils may be divided into two classes: Voluntary evils (Sins) and Involuntary evils (Pain and Suffering). The evils of the first class are really “the” evil, that is, objects to be avoided and hated. They are also the greatest evils, because they injure at the same time their own author and the Author of nature. God cannot cause, but only permit and oppose them. The evils of the second class are only evils of the subject which naturally abhors them, yet they are not so detestable as to be avoided in all cases. God may cause them and use them as means to His ends; notably, as a penalty for sin. In the original order established by Him, there was no room for evils of this class. They came into the world with sin. As a matter of fact, then, all evils existing in this world spring from sin, the greatest and original evil. Hence the above division is equivalent to another which distinguishes “Evils of Guilt” and “Evils of Penalty” (mala culpæ, mala pænæ). Many evils may, however, be at the same time a guilt and a penalty.
II. Sin, in its theological and proper sense, consists in the conscious and voluntary transgression, lesion, or denial of the moral order imposed upon the creature by Divine Law. The philosophical notion of sin does not contain the element of Divine command. What to the theologian is a voluntary transgression of the law of God is looked upon by the philosopher as a transgression of the rational and natural order. Yet even in sound philosophy the notion of sin ought not to be dissociated from disobedience to the Lawgiver, for sin is always an action against the dictates of conscience, and these are but the commanding voice of God (Rom. 2:14–16).
I. Hence the essence of sin consists in the more or less express opposition of the human will against the Divine Will, an opposition which implies a certain neglect or contempt of the Divine Will itself. This contempt involves an “aversion from God as the ultimate End,” that is, a refusal of the submission and love which are His due. Sin averts or turns away the creature from God as the Highest Good in Himself, and from God as the Highest Good of the creature itself, in Whom alone it can find perfect beatitude. It seeks outside God a satisfaction or pleasure incompatible with the possession and fruition of God. On God’s side, the contempt of His will by the creature constitutes an offence and an insult, according to the saying, “The lawbreaker offends the lawmaker.” And this offence always includes an “injury;” that is, it injures or damages the external glory of God. For this reason, Holy Scripture describes sin as injustice and iniquity. Again, sin being always committed under the very eyes or in the face of God, it must needs excite His displeasure, abhorrence, indignation, and anger. These affections in God are not accompanied by the same feelings as in man (sect. 65), yet they exist in Him eminently; and it is not the defect of malice in sin, but God’s own immutability, which prevents Him from being affected with infinite pain by the sinner. In sins against the theological virtues, and against the virtue of religion, the aversion and offence assume a direct character, because God is the immediate object of these virtues.
2. Sin is clearly the greatest of evils—and an absolute evil, because it deprives the Greatest and Absolute Good of the honour due to Him. It is, however, infinite only in a restricted sense, viz. inasmuch as being directed against the Infinite Good, it deserves to be detested with a hatred as great as the love due to God; and inasmuch as it surpasses in greatness any quantity of other evils, and cannot be fully compensated for by any number of finite good works.
3. Sin acquires a special theological character, from its being a violation of the order of grace which establishes between God and His creatures relations essentially higher than any natural relations. In the order of grace, God reveals Himself to man as his supernatural end, and offers him supernatural means for arriving at his supernatural destination. The sinful action which destroys these relations is therefore far more wicked than a sin against the natural order; it is no longer the disobedience of a servant, but the revolt of a son against his Father, the infidelity of the bride to the Bridegroom, an insult to the Holy Ghost, Who is the bond of union between the Creator and His sanctified creature, an attack upon the sanctity of the soul. This special theological character exists subjectively only when the sinner knows his supernatural vocation, as in the case of the fallen angels, of our first parents, and of Christians generally. Sins committed before Baptism are free from this particular malice, unless sanctifying grace has been infused by God in one of the two ways which supply temporarily the actual administration of the sacrament. See St. Thomas, 1 qq. 48, 49; 1 2, q. 71.
I. 1. EVERY substance is in itself good; it becomes bad only when it is itself deprived of some perfection or when it deprives another substance of some perfection. Hence evil is the privation of some good, or a corruption of good. It is nothing positive, but the negation of a positive perfection. However, evil mostly consists of some positive disposition opposed to the perfection of the subject, which disposition is then evil in as far as it implies the negatives of perfection. As evil is only an accident, it must exist in a substance as its subject. Again, since it connotes a deficiency in perfection, it can only exist in finite and changeable beings. In these, however, the possibility of evil is connatural with the changeableness consequent upon their origin out of nothing; as no definite grade of perfection is essential to them, so the amount they actually receive is capable of decrease or increase. In the case of man, his composition of mind and matter necessarily exposes him to certain evils or imperfections.
2. The cause of evil is not something evil in itself. On the contrary, evil can only be produced accidentally by a cause which is itself good, and aims at some good object. In bodily evils this is manifest; the causes which inflict bodily suffering do so in the exercise of forces which are good in themselves, but which come into conflict with other forces. The evils arising from free actions are due to a good but misapplied principle. Sin, in particular, is possible only because it appears to the sinner as a subjective good. Hence the axiom: Evil is caused by good (causa mali bonum). Evil has, however, no efficient but rather a deficient cause; it owes its existence either to the defective action of a positive cause or to defective resistance to opposing influences.
3. From a theological point of view, evils may be divided into two classes: Voluntary evils (Sins) and Involuntary evils (Pain and Suffering). The evils of the first class are really “the” evil, that is, objects to be avoided and hated. They are also the greatest evils, because they injure at the same time their own author and the Author of nature. God cannot cause, but only permit and oppose them. The evils of the second class are only evils of the subject which naturally abhors them, yet they are not so detestable as to be avoided in all cases. God may cause them and use them as means to His ends; notably, as a penalty for sin. In the original order established by Him, there was no room for evils of this class. They came into the world with sin. As a matter of fact, then, all evils existing in this world spring from sin, the greatest and original evil. Hence the above division is equivalent to another which distinguishes “Evils of Guilt” and “Evils of Penalty” (mala culpæ, mala pænæ). Many evils may, however, be at the same time a guilt and a penalty.
II. Sin, in its theological and proper sense, consists in the conscious and voluntary transgression, lesion, or denial of the moral order imposed upon the creature by Divine Law. The philosophical notion of sin does not contain the element of Divine command. What to the theologian is a voluntary transgression of the law of God is looked upon by the philosopher as a transgression of the rational and natural order. Yet even in sound philosophy the notion of sin ought not to be dissociated from disobedience to the Lawgiver, for sin is always an action against the dictates of conscience, and these are but the commanding voice of God (Rom. 2:14–16).
I. Hence the essence of sin consists in the more or less express opposition of the human will against the Divine Will, an opposition which implies a certain neglect or contempt of the Divine Will itself. This contempt involves an “aversion from God as the ultimate End,” that is, a refusal of the submission and love which are His due. Sin averts or turns away the creature from God as the Highest Good in Himself, and from God as the Highest Good of the creature itself, in Whom alone it can find perfect beatitude. It seeks outside God a satisfaction or pleasure incompatible with the possession and fruition of God. On God’s side, the contempt of His will by the creature constitutes an offence and an insult, according to the saying, “The lawbreaker offends the lawmaker.” And this offence always includes an “injury;” that is, it injures or damages the external glory of God. For this reason, Holy Scripture describes sin as injustice and iniquity. Again, sin being always committed under the very eyes or in the face of God, it must needs excite His displeasure, abhorrence, indignation, and anger. These affections in God are not accompanied by the same feelings as in man (sect. 65), yet they exist in Him eminently; and it is not the defect of malice in sin, but God’s own immutability, which prevents Him from being affected with infinite pain by the sinner. In sins against the theological virtues, and against the virtue of religion, the aversion and offence assume a direct character, because God is the immediate object of these virtues.
2. Sin is clearly the greatest of evils—and an absolute evil, because it deprives the Greatest and Absolute Good of the honour due to Him. It is, however, infinite only in a restricted sense, viz. inasmuch as being directed against the Infinite Good, it deserves to be detested with a hatred as great as the love due to God; and inasmuch as it surpasses in greatness any quantity of other evils, and cannot be fully compensated for by any number of finite good works.
3. Sin acquires a special theological character, from its being a violation of the order of grace which establishes between God and His creatures relations essentially higher than any natural relations. In the order of grace, God reveals Himself to man as his supernatural end, and offers him supernatural means for arriving at his supernatural destination. The sinful action which destroys these relations is therefore far more wicked than a sin against the natural order; it is no longer the disobedience of a servant, but the revolt of a son against his Father, the infidelity of the bride to the Bridegroom, an insult to the Holy Ghost, Who is the bond of union between the Creator and His sanctified creature, an attack upon the sanctity of the soul. This special theological character exists subjectively only when the sinner knows his supernatural vocation, as in the case of the fallen angels, of our first parents, and of Christians generally. Sins committed before Baptism are free from this particular malice, unless sanctifying grace has been infused by God in one of the two ways which supply temporarily the actual administration of the sacrament. See St. Thomas, 1 qq. 48, 49; 1 2, q. 71.
Seção 53% da obra, de A Manual of Catholic Theology (Wilhelm & Scannell, sobre a Dogmatik de Scheeben). Ver o original.