Sect. 157The Effects of Sin on the SinnerThe Effects of Sin on the Sinner
I. The first effect of sin on the soul is to inflict upon it a stain, in the same manner as contact with unclean things defiles the body. Another effect is to make the sinner guilty and liable to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ). These effects are inseparable. Holy Scripture describes them as unrighteousness or injustice. They entail, as a consequence, that the sinner becomes, in the eyes of God, an object of displeasure and disgust; an object of hatred, at least in the sense of being unworthy of God’s continued benevolence; an object of anger, which Divine justice must visit with punishment.
The stain and guilt of sin, with the concomitant Divine displeasure, hatred, and anger, may fitly be considered as the first punishment of sin, for they are incurred against the will of the sinner, and make themselves felt as uneasiness, shame, and remorse. “Thou hast decreed it, and so it comes to pass, that every disordered soul shall be to itself its own punishment” (St. Aug., Confess. i. 12). They belong to mortal sin in their entirety; venial sin produces them only in a very partial sense.
II. Sin leaves behind it certain real and permanent effects which are commonly designated as “an impairing of natural goodness” (diminutio, corruptio, vitiatio boni naturæ). Sin cannot destroy either the substance or the faculties of the soul in themselves; its baneful influence only affects the perfection of their exercise and their supernatural endowment. An effect common to mortal and venial sin, in the natural and supernatural order, is the production of an inclination of the will towards evil. The frequent repetition of sinful acts bends the will in a wrong direction, and hampers it in avoiding evil and doing good. From the will the difficulty extends to the intellect, inclining it to judge falsely of things moral; and in man it even affects the sensitive appetites. The perversity thus engendered may render the difficulty of doing good insuperable, and may, for all practical purposes, extinguish free will. Such blinding or hardening (Isa. 6:9; Acts 28:26; Rom. 11:8; Matt. 13:14, etc.) is seldom, if ever, absolute in man; usually it extends only to certain kinds of actions, and even as to these, the freedom of the will is not radically extinct. Considered in relation to grace, which is the normal life of the soul, the incapacity for good becomes an inaptitude for receiving the effective operation of grace, or a diminution of the natural receptivity for the action of grace, together with a difficulty in co-operating with it.
III. In the supernatural order, mortal sin causes the loss of all the supernatural goodness of the soul, and extinguishes its supernatural life (§ 156). The withdrawal of supernatural grace is a punishment inflicted by God on the sinner; it is also a direct and logical consequence of sin itself. Sin unfits the soul for the indwelling of grace, just as disorganization unfits the body for the indwelling of the soul. The exclusion of grace is due to, and co-extensive with, its formal opposition to sin—grace being love, and sin contempt, of God. Hence all mortal sins cause the immediate loss of charity and of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), whereas faith and hope are only excluded by the sins directly opposed to them. Yet every mortal sin deserves the loss of all supernatural virtues and of all gifts of grace, because the sinner renders himself unworthy of Divine favours, and because all such favours are connected with sanctifying grace. If sins be not cancelled, this punishment is sure to follow in time—at least at the day of judgment. It need not follow immediately; wherefore, if it pleases God to allow the sinner still to tend towards his supernatural end, He does not withdraw the necessary graces except when the sinner makes himself not only unworthy but also unfit for them.
IV. Theologians generally hold that venial sin does not diminish sanctifying grace or infused virtues. These gifts participate in the incorruptibility of spiritual substances; they are not imperishable, yet they are beyond the reach of corrupting created action. Unlike acquired virtues, they are incapable of decrease or increase by the exertions of the subject. Hence venial sin could only cause their loss by completely destroying them; but from its nature venial sin is compatible with grace. Nor can it be said that each venial sin is punished by the withdrawal of a certain degree of grace; because this would entail the loss of a corresponding degree of eternal glory, and so inflict eternal punishment for an offence whose commensurate punishment is merely the keeping back of certain special favours and the postponement of the final reward. Venial sin only impairs the natural disposition for good, while mortal sin destroys the temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 6:19), and changes man from spiritual into animal (1 Cor. 2:14); it infects the whole nature, and thus becomes the cause of new sins or of acts deficient in goodness. The absence of sanctifying grace makes further meritorious acts impossible, and weakens the sinner for future temptations.
V. The moral effects of an act are those which the act causes another person to produce; hence the moral effects of a sinful act are the pains and penalties which it causes God to inflict upon the sinner. The object of these penalties is manifold. The chief object is to avenge the injury done to God’s dignity and holiness by afflicting the sinner with evils affecting his own dignity and well-being. Other penalties aim at the atonement or satisfaction for the sins committed, and others again are purely medicinal. The Schoolmen call these several penalties, pæna vindicativa, satisfactoria, medicinalis.
1. Each sin, without exception, has affixed to it a proportionate penalty; or, in other words, each sin makes its author liable to commensurate punishment. The liability lasts as long as the sin.
2. Only sin properly so called can deserve punishment; or, at least, the liability to punishment varies exactly in the same degree as the guilt of sin. Hence one person can only be punished for the sins of another if, and in as far as, he participates in the other person’s guilt.
3. To the penalties of sin belong first the stain and guilt of sin and the liability to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ) contracted by the sinner. The punishment itself consists in the withdrawal or keeping back of gifts which, but for his sin, were destined to the sinner. Thus, in mortal sin, sanctifying grace and eternal life are lost; in venial sin the grant of the final reward is delayed for a time, and the superabundant communication of actual graces is reduced to those necessary for the increase of merit and the avoidance of sin. Other penalties are the withdrawal of temporal goods and the infliction of temporal evils, intended to punish the selfishness and pride which lie at the bottom of every sin.
4. The penalty attaching to mortal sin is infinite inasmuch as it deprives the sinner of an infinite good; the beatific vision of God for all eternity. This penalty is exactly commensurate to the greatness of the sin, which consists in the contempt of that same infinite and eternal good, and deprives the sinner of the power to make good his loss. See St. Bonaventure, In II. Sent. Dist. 35; St. Thomas, 1 2 , qq. 85, 87.
I. The first effect of sin on the soul is to inflict upon it a stain, in the same manner as contact with unclean things defiles the body. Another effect is to make the sinner guilty and liable to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ). These effects are inseparable. Holy Scripture describes them as unrighteousness or injustice. They entail, as a consequence, that the sinner becomes, in the eyes of God, an object of displeasure and disgust; an object of hatred, at least in the sense of being unworthy of God’s continued benevolence; an object of anger, which Divine justice must visit with punishment.
The stain and guilt of sin, with the concomitant Divine displeasure, hatred, and anger, may fitly be considered as the first punishment of sin, for they are incurred against the will of the sinner, and make themselves felt as uneasiness, shame, and remorse. “Thou hast decreed it, and so it comes to pass, that every disordered soul shall be to itself its own punishment” (St. Aug., Confess. i. 12). They belong to mortal sin in their entirety; venial sin produces them only in a very partial sense.
II. Sin leaves behind it certain real and permanent effects which are commonly designated as “an impairing of natural goodness” (diminutio, corruptio, vitiatio boni naturæ). Sin cannot destroy either the substance or the faculties of the soul in themselves; its baneful influence only affects the perfection of their exercise and their supernatural endowment. An effect common to mortal and venial sin, in the natural and supernatural order, is the production of an inclination of the will towards evil. The frequent repetition of sinful acts bends the will in a wrong direction, and hampers it in avoiding evil and doing good. From the will the difficulty extends to the intellect, inclining it to judge falsely of things moral; and in man it even affects the sensitive appetites. The perversity thus engendered may render the difficulty of doing good insuperable, and may, for all practical purposes, extinguish free will. Such blinding or hardening (Isa. 6:9; Acts 28:26; Rom. 11:8; Matt. 13:14, etc.) is seldom, if ever, absolute in man; usually it extends only to certain kinds of actions, and even as to these, the freedom of the will is not radically extinct. Considered in relation to grace, which is the normal life of the soul, the incapacity for good becomes an inaptitude for receiving the effective operation of grace, or a diminution of the natural receptivity for the action of grace, together with a difficulty in co-operating with it.
III. In the supernatural order, mortal sin causes the loss of all the supernatural goodness of the soul, and extinguishes its supernatural life (§ 156). The withdrawal of supernatural grace is a punishment inflicted by God on the sinner; it is also a direct and logical consequence of sin itself. Sin unfits the soul for the indwelling of grace, just as disorganization unfits the body for the indwelling of the soul. The exclusion of grace is due to, and co-extensive with, its formal opposition to sin—grace being love, and sin contempt, of God. Hence all mortal sins cause the immediate loss of charity and of sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens), whereas faith and hope are only excluded by the sins directly opposed to them. Yet every mortal sin deserves the loss of all supernatural virtues and of all gifts of grace, because the sinner renders himself unworthy of Divine favours, and because all such favours are connected with sanctifying grace. If sins be not cancelled, this punishment is sure to follow in time—at least at the day of judgment. It need not follow immediately; wherefore, if it pleases God to allow the sinner still to tend towards his supernatural end, He does not withdraw the necessary graces except when the sinner makes himself not only unworthy but also unfit for them.
IV. Theologians generally hold that venial sin does not diminish sanctifying grace or infused virtues. These gifts participate in the incorruptibility of spiritual substances; they are not imperishable, yet they are beyond the reach of corrupting created action. Unlike acquired virtues, they are incapable of decrease or increase by the exertions of the subject. Hence venial sin could only cause their loss by completely destroying them; but from its nature venial sin is compatible with grace. Nor can it be said that each venial sin is punished by the withdrawal of a certain degree of grace; because this would entail the loss of a corresponding degree of eternal glory, and so inflict eternal punishment for an offence whose commensurate punishment is merely the keeping back of certain special favours and the postponement of the final reward. Venial sin only impairs the natural disposition for good, while mortal sin destroys the temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 6:19), and changes man from spiritual into animal (1 Cor. 2:14); it infects the whole nature, and thus becomes the cause of new sins or of acts deficient in goodness. The absence of sanctifying grace makes further meritorious acts impossible, and weakens the sinner for future temptations.
V. The moral effects of an act are those which the act causes another person to produce; hence the moral effects of a sinful act are the pains and penalties which it causes God to inflict upon the sinner. The object of these penalties is manifold. The chief object is to avenge the injury done to God’s dignity and holiness by afflicting the sinner with evils affecting his own dignity and well-being. Other penalties aim at the atonement or satisfaction for the sins committed, and others again are purely medicinal. The Schoolmen call these several penalties, pæna vindicativa, satisfactoria, medicinalis.
1. Each sin, without exception, has affixed to it a proportionate penalty; or, in other words, each sin makes its author liable to commensurate punishment. The liability lasts as long as the sin.
2. Only sin properly so called can deserve punishment; or, at least, the liability to punishment varies exactly in the same degree as the guilt of sin. Hence one person can only be punished for the sins of another if, and in as far as, he participates in the other person’s guilt.
3. To the penalties of sin belong first the stain and guilt of sin and the liability to punishment (reatus culpæ et pænæ) contracted by the sinner. The punishment itself consists in the withdrawal or keeping back of gifts which, but for his sin, were destined to the sinner. Thus, in mortal sin, sanctifying grace and eternal life are lost; in venial sin the grant of the final reward is delayed for a time, and the superabundant communication of actual graces is reduced to those necessary for the increase of merit and the avoidance of sin. Other penalties are the withdrawal of temporal goods and the infliction of temporal evils, intended to punish the selfishness and pride which lie at the bottom of every sin.
4. The penalty attaching to mortal sin is infinite inasmuch as it deprives the sinner of an infinite good; the beatific vision of God for all eternity. This penalty is exactly commensurate to the greatness of the sin, which consists in the contempt of that same infinite and eternal good, and deprives the sinner of the power to make good his loss. See St. Bonaventure, In II. Sent. Dist. 35; St. Thomas, 1 2 , qq. 85, 87.
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