Sect. 88Efficacy of the Divine Will—its Dominion Over Created WillsEfficacy of the Divine Will—its Dominion Over Created Wills

I. In all rational beings, the will is the determining principle of their external activity, the perfection of which is proportioned to the perfection of the will and of the person willing. The Divine Will, being in itself absolutely perfect and identical with the Divine Wisdom, Power, and Dignity, possesses the highest possible efficacy in its external operations: all being and all activity proceed from it, and are supported by it, so that nothing is done without its influence or permission. Sovereign control over every other will is exercised by the Divine Will, and is the brightest manifestation of its internal perfection. We are about to study this particular aspect of the Divine Will in its bearing upon the created will: its general efficacy has been dealt with in the section on Omnipotence.

II. The Divine Will exhibits to the created will the ideal of moral perfection and sanctity to be aimed at; and, in virtue of the absolute excellence and dominion of God, the decrees of His Will impose upon the created will a law which creatures are in duty bound to fulfil. The power of God is the only power which can impose a duty in virtue of its own excellence; wherefore also every duty ought to be founded upon the power of God as upon its binding principle. The created will is essentially dependent on no other will than the Divine, and no other will than the Will of God is absolutely worshipful. On the other hand, our notion of duty implies that we are bound to do, not only what we apprehend as most in harmony with the exigencies of our nature, but also what a superior Will, to which we are essentially subjected, and which we apprehend as absolutely worshipful, commands us to do. Other law-givers can only impose obligations inasmuch as they represent God and act in His name; the exigencies of our nature are binding upon us only inasmuch as they express the Will of the Creator. Even the eternal rule of the Divine Wisdom, whereby God knows what is fitting for His creatures, only becomes law through the Divine Will commanding creatures to conform to it.

III. Again, the Divine Will acts on the created will in such a way as to move it intrinsically; that is, it influences the genesis and the direction of the acts of the human will. The created will owes its very existence and energy to the Will of God. Hence its active liberty or self-determination is the fruit of the activity of the Divine Will. The exercise of created liberty cannot be conceived independently of a Divine motive influence, so much so, that the good actions of the creature are in the first place actions of God. For the same reason, the Divine Will can move the human will, not merely from without by presenting to it motives or inducements to act, but also physically from within, so as to incline or even to impel the will to certain acts. Hence, again, the Divine Will has the power to prevent, by direct influence, all the acts of the human will which God will not permit, and to bring about all the acts which He desires to be performed, even so as to cause a complete reversion of the inclinations existing in the created will. All this God does without interfering with created freedom. He aims at and obtains the free performance of the acts in question. “It is God Who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will” (Phil. 2:13; cf. Isai. 26:12; Prov. 21:1; Rom. 11:23). This doctrine should inspire us with great confidence when praying for the conversion of obstinate sinners, or for our own conversion from inveterate evil habits: “Ad Te nostras etiam rebelles compelle propitius voluntates!” (Secret. Dom. iv. post Pent). Cf. St. Thorn., I. q. 111, a. 2.

IV. Although, absolutely speaking, the decrees of the Divine Will are always efficacious and can never be frustrated through the interference of any other will, it is nevertheless true that, in more than one respect, not all that God wills is actually accomplished. The created will sometimes opposes the Will of the Creator, resisting it and rendering His intentions vain. We cannot, however, say that the created will overcomes the Divine Will, or that the latter is powerless. In order completely to understand this point the decrees of the Divine Will should be considered separately in their principal features.

1. The decrees relating to the moral order of the world are not always fulfilled in their first and original form—that is, as expressing the moral law which God commands His creatures to follow: for creatures are physically free to refuse submission to the moral law of God. But by so doing they neither overcome the Divine Will nor do they prove it powerless. The Divine Will is not overcome, because from the beginning its decree is directed upon the alternative that either the creature shall voluntarily submit to the law, or shall be forced into submission to it by the Divine Justice. Nor is the Divine Will made powerless, because the power proper to the Divine decree is the imposition of an obligation, an obligation which binds the sinner even when he despises it. The ruling or governing decrees of the Divine Will are still less impaired by sin, because the permission of sin is included in these same decrees. Thus God always is the conqueror of sin and sinners.

2. The Divine decrees relating to the last end of rational creatures, in as far as they express the first and original intention of the Divine Will (which is that all men should be saved, 1 Tim. 2:4), are likewise liable to be frustrated through the refusal of co-operation on the part of creatures. But here also the Divine Will asserts its power. The salvation of all mankind is subordinate to a higher object, viz. the glorification of God through rational creatures. But this higher object is always attained, either by the salvation or the just punishment of man. Furthermore, the will to save all mankind is not proved powerless by the refusal of co-operation on the part of man, because its essential efficacy only consists in making salvation possible to all men; nor does its sincerity require that God should procure unconditionally the co-operation of man. Besides, it is not want of power that prevents God from enforcing co-operation, but His free Will.

3. Lastly, the Divine decrees relating to the performance of acts dependent on human co-operation may also be frustrated in as far as they only conditionally intend the performance of these acts. The decrees do not always include the will to enforce co-operation, but only to assist it and to render it possible. Whenever the will to enforce co-operation is included, co-operation is infallibly secured, for, in this supposition, God makes such use of His power as to incline the will of man freely to co-operate in the desired action.

V. Are all good actions which actually take place the effect of a Divine decree enforcing free co-operation? This is a question of detail, which cannot be solved offhand by invoking the infallible efficacy of the Divine Will, and which it would be rash to answer at once in the affirmative. Some would hold that, besides the Divine decrees which God intends to be infallibly efficacious, there may be others likewise efficacious, although not intended to be so infallibly. Considering the way in which God wills, assists, and renders possible the good deeds of man, it is not easy to admit that only those good deeds should really be performed which God unconditionally desires to be performed. If this were the case, it would seem as if God were not in earnest when He renders possible a good deed without at the same time securing its actual accomplishment. To avoid this semblance it is best not to admit a Divine decree unconditional at the outset, but rather a general decree (or intention) conditional at the outset and made absolute by the prevision of the actual fulfilment of the condition. There still remains room for the display of a special mercy in the infallible prevention of abuses of freedom; whereas, on the other hand, the frustration of the conditional decree is exclusively attributable to the misuse of freedom. More on this subject will be found in the treatise on Grace.

In theological language the above doctrine is shortly formulated as follows: The Divine Will is not always fulfilled as Voluntas Antecedens, i.e. considered in its original designs, as they are before God takes into account the actual behaviour of created wills; it is always fulfilled as Voluntas Consequens, i.e. considered in its designs as they are after taking into account the actual behaviour of free creatures. The Voluntas Antecedens is a velle secundum quid (= conditional); the Voluntas Consequens is a velle simpliciter (= absolute). It should be noted that the terms Voluntas Antecedens and Consequens are not always used in the same sense by all theologians, because they do not all consider the same object as their term of comparison. See St. Bonaventure (in I. Sent., dist. 47, a. 1) for a beautiful exposition of the doctrine here in question.