Sect. 82The Nature and Attributes of the Divine Will Considered GenerallyThe Nature and Attributes of the Divine Will Considered Generally

I. That God has a Will, and a most perfect Will, is evident to faith and reason alike. The will is an essential of a living spirit; without it there could be in God no power, no beatitude, no sanctity, or justice.

II. The fundamental property of the Divine as opposed to the created will, is its real identity with the Divine Substance. “Will,” says St. Bonaventure (in I. Sent., dist. 45, a. 1), “is in God in a more proper and complete manner than in us. For in us it is a faculty distinct from our substance and actually distant from its object; whereas in the Divine Will there is no difference whatsoever between substance, power, act and object.” Hence in God there can be no successive acts of will, no desires, or tendencies. The essential act of the Divine Will consists in the delight with which God embraces and contains Himself as the Highest Good. This delight extends to things outside Him, only, however, in order to bring them into existence; not to derive from them any increment of perfection or happiness. In itself the act of the Divine Will is possession and fruition; in its relation to external goods it can but freely distribute its own abundance.

III. An immediate consequence of the identity of God’s Will with His Substance, is that with Him there can be no question of a cause moving the will, or of anything influencing it from without: the uncreated act, by which all things are created, cannot be subject to such influences. It is indeed essential to the Divine Will, even more than to the will of creatures, to act for an object, and consequently to determine Itself to the choice and disposition of appropriate means to attain the intended object. The object, however, is not a cause moving the Divine Will, but the reason why the Divine Will moves Itself. In God, the first motive and the ultimate object of His Will are really identical with His Will; they are His Essence considered as the supreme objective Good. All subordinate motives and objects are dependent on the primary one; they are only motives and objects because God wills them to be such. Hence subordinate motives and ends do not act on the Divine Will in itself; they are but the reason why It directs Itself upon some particular object, and orders or disposes it in some particular manner. The free actions of creatures are but circumstances in creation, brought about or permitted by God Himself, and of which He takes notice for His own sake; they are by no means external causes moving the Divine Will to action.

The supreme goodness of the Divine Will is the reason and the rule determining the direction of the Divine volition to definite objects. God loves His own goodness and therefore He wills its glorification and communication ad extra, and determines by what means these objects are to be attained. Thus the love of God for Himself causes Him to will things outside Him, just as the desires and inclinations of our will cause us to act; with this difference, however, that in God the satisfaction of such desires is neither a want nor a cause of new volitions.

The doctrine here stated is common among the theologians, although they differ in the way of expressing it. See Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, disp. xv.

IV. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is the peculiar relation between the Divine Will and its objects, and between the objects themselves. The love of self is, with creatures, a condition and the starting-point of all their volitions. As, however, the objects of their desires exist outside and independently of them, and as their perfection and felicity are themselves dependent on the possession of external goods, the love of self is not a sufficient object for all their volitions; it is itself but part of higher aims and objects. But God is Himself the proximate and principal object of His volition. All other things the Divine Will attains without being in any way determined or perfected by them; they are either not intended for themselves at all, or at most as subordinate ends. “The Lord hath made all things for Himself” (Prov. 16:4). God has created the world “of His own goodness, not to increase His happiness or to acquire but to manifest His goodness by means of the good things which He bestows on creatures” (Vatican Council, sess. iii., ch. 1).

The manner in which God’s Love of Self determines His love of creatures is as follows:—

1. As the Infinite Good is most communicable, fruitful, and powerful, the love of it implies love of communicating it.

2. Again, as it is the Supreme Beauty, and is capable of being copied and multiplied, the love of it excites a love of reproducing it.

3. The supreme dignity and majesty of the highest Good is worthy of honour and glory; hence God is induced to create beings able to give Him honour and glory.

Thus all things find the motive of their existence in the Divine Self-Love; and in it, too, they find their ultimate object. They are made in order to participate in the goodness of God, and to cling to Him with love; to reproduce His beauty, to know and to praise it; to submit to His majesty by honouring and serving Him.

From this genesis and order of God’s volitions we infer another difference between the manner in which the Divine Will and the created will bear upon their objects. The created will, when willing things as means and instruments to other ends, does not value them in themselves, but only inasmuch as they are means. God, on the contrary, although His creatures are only means to His glory, intends really and truly that they should possess the perfections communicated to them, and He takes pleasure in the goodness, beauty, and dignity, which make them copies of the Divine ideal; nay, He offers Himself as the object of their possession and fruition. Hence we perceive the benevolence, esteem, and appreciation with which God honours the goodness and dignity of His creatures. There is no selfishness on His side and no degradation on the side of creatures, although they are but means for the glory of God.

V. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is that all the positive and negative attributes of the Divine Substance must be applied to the Divine Will. It is absolutely independent, simple, infinite, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, etc.

I. That God has a Will, and a most perfect Will, is evident to faith and reason alike. The will is an essential of a living spirit; without it there could be in God no power, no beatitude, no sanctity, or justice.

II. The fundamental property of the Divine as opposed to the created will, is its real identity with the Divine Substance. “Will,” says St. Bonaventure (in I. Sent., dist. 45, a. 1), “is in God in a more proper and complete manner than in us. For in us it is a faculty distinct from our substance and actually distant from its object; whereas in the Divine Will there is no difference whatsoever between substance, power, act and object.” Hence in God there can be no successive acts of will, no desires, or tendencies. The essential act of the Divine Will consists in the delight with which God embraces and contains Himself as the Highest Good. This delight extends to things outside Him, only, however, in order to bring them into existence; not to derive from them any increment of perfection or happiness. In itself the act of the Divine Will is possession and fruition; in its relation to external goods it can but freely distribute its own abundance.

III. An immediate consequence of the identity of God’s Will with His Substance, is that with Him there can be no question of a cause moving the will, or of anything influencing it from without: the uncreated act, by which all things are created, cannot be subject to such influences. It is indeed essential to the Divine Will, even more than to the will of creatures, to act for an object, and consequently to determine Itself to the choice and disposition of appropriate means to attain the intended object. The object, however, is not a cause moving the Divine Will, but the reason why the Divine Will moves Itself. In God, the first motive and the ultimate object of His Will are really identical with His Will; they are His Essence considered as the supreme objective Good. All subordinate motives and objects are dependent on the primary one; they are only motives and objects because God wills them to be such. Hence subordinate motives and ends do not act on the Divine Will in itself; they are but the reason why It directs Itself upon some particular object, and orders or disposes it in some particular manner. The free actions of creatures are but circumstances in creation, brought about or permitted by God Himself, and of which He takes notice for His own sake; they are by no means external causes moving the Divine Will to action.

The supreme goodness of the Divine Will is the reason and the rule determining the direction of the Divine volition to definite objects. God loves His own goodness and therefore He wills its glorification and communication ad extra, and determines by what means these objects are to be attained. Thus the love of God for Himself causes Him to will things outside Him, just as the desires and inclinations of our will cause us to act; with this difference, however, that in God the satisfaction of such desires is neither a want nor a cause of new volitions.

The doctrine here stated is common among the theologians, although they differ in the way of expressing it. See Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, disp. xv.

IV. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is the peculiar relation between the Divine Will and its objects, and between the objects themselves. The love of self is, with creatures, a condition and the starting-point of all their volitions. As, however, the objects of their desires exist outside and independently of them, and as their perfection and felicity are themselves dependent on the possession of external goods, the love of self is not a sufficient object for all their volitions; it is itself but part of higher aims and objects. But God is Himself the proximate and principal object of His volition. All other things the Divine Will attains without being in any way determined or perfected by them; they are either not intended for themselves at all, or at most as subordinate ends. “The Lord hath made all things for Himself” (Prov. 16:4). God has created the world “of His own goodness, not to increase His happiness or to acquire but to manifest His goodness by means of the good things which He bestows on creatures” (Vatican Council, sess. iii., ch. 1).

The manner in which God’s Love of Self determines His love of creatures is as follows:—

1. As the Infinite Good is most communicable, fruitful, and powerful, the love of it implies love of communicating it.

2. Again, as it is the Supreme Beauty, and is capable of being copied and multiplied, the love of it excites a love of reproducing it.

3. The supreme dignity and majesty of the highest Good is worthy of honour and glory; hence God is induced to create beings able to give Him honour and glory.

Thus all things find the motive of their existence in the Divine Self-Love; and in it, too, they find their ultimate object. They are made in order to participate in the goodness of God, and to cling to Him with love; to reproduce His beauty, to know and to praise it; to submit to His majesty by honouring and serving Him.

From this genesis and order of God’s volitions we infer another difference between the manner in which the Divine Will and the created will bear upon their objects. The created will, when willing things as means and instruments to other ends, does not value them in themselves, but only inasmuch as they are means. God, on the contrary, although His creatures are only means to His glory, intends really and truly that they should possess the perfections communicated to them, and He takes pleasure in the goodness, beauty, and dignity, which make them copies of the Divine ideal; nay, He offers Himself as the object of their possession and fruition. Hence we perceive the benevolence, esteem, and appreciation with which God honours the goodness and dignity of His creatures. There is no selfishness on His side and no degradation on the side of creatures, although they are but means for the glory of God.

V. Another consequence of the identity of Will and Substance in God is that all the positive and negative attributes of the Divine Substance must be applied to the Divine Will. It is absolutely independent, simple, infinite, immutable, eternal, omnipresent, etc.

Seção 28% da obra, de A Manual of Catholic Theology (Wilhelm & Scannell, sobre a Dogmatik de Scheeben). Ver o original.