Sect. 47Theological KnowledgeTheological Knowledge

I. The immediate object of the Understanding of Faith is to present to the mind of the believer a true, distinct, and comparatively perfect notion of what he must believe. A further object is to evolve from Faith a wider and deeper knowledge rooted in Faith but not formally identical with it, and having a certitude of its own similar to the certitude of Faith, but not exactly of the same kind.

Revealed truths, just like natural truths, can be used as principles from which other truths may be logically inferred. When so used, these revealed truths are called Theological Reasons, as distinguished from human or natural reasons. In the domain of natural science, the certitude with which we adhere to the conclusion of an argument is only an extension of our certitude of the premises, and is of the same kind. But in the domain of Faith our certitude of the conclusion of an argument is the result of two distinct factors—Faith and reason,—and is therefore essentially different from and inferior to our certitude of one of the premises. This kind of certitude is called Theological Certitude. Hence Theological Knowledge differs, on the one hand, from philosophical or natural science; and, on the other hand, from the knowledge of the revealed principles from which it starts. Like natural science, it has complete scientific value only when its demonstrations are based on principles which are the real objective causes of the conclusions; in other words, only when it shows not merely that the thing is (quia est, ὅτι), but also why and wherefore it is (propter quid sit, διότι). But since Faith, as such, requires us to know only what its subject-matter is, we have here another difference between simple Faith and Theological Knowledge.

II. It is an open question whether the certitude of theological conclusions is supernatural or merely natural. If we consider that the conclusion cannot be stronger than the weaker of the premises, it would seem that theological conclusions are only humanly or naturally certain. On the other hand, theological conclusions are organically connected with the Understanding of Faith, from which they spring as their root, and of which they are a natural expansion. They are also supported by the pious and loving disposition to believe. The true theologian looks upon the rational minor premise less as a partial motive than as a means whereby he arrives at the full comprehension of the major premise. God, Who preserves His Church from error when she proposes theological conclusions for our belief, will likewise extend His grace to the assent which the theologian gives to similar conclusions. At any rate, all this goes to prove that the assent to theological conclusions is of a higher character than the assent of heretics and infidels founded upon human motives, and that consequently these latter can no more possess true theological science than supernatural Faith. We see, too, that Theological Knowledge, in its principles and conclusions, enjoys a more sacred and inviolable certitude than any human science, and that every human certitude not intrinsically and extrinsically perfect must give way to theological conclusions perfectly ascertained.