Sect. 222Grace and Man’s Liability to Venial SinGrace and Man’s Liability to Venial Sin

I. Another point in connection with the life of grace remains to be elucidated. The Pelagians maintained that a perfect, sinless life was possible by the mere powers of our nature. They considered the “perfection of justice” to consist in impeccancy or sinlessness and freedom from concupiscence. That doctrine was assailed by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Second Council of Milevis, and again by the Council of Trent. “If any one saith that man, being once justified, is able to avoid all sins, even venial, during all his life, without a special Divine privilege such as the Church holds was granted to the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema” (sess. vi. can. 23).

II. The sins which even the just cannot always avoid, are not those known as mortal, or destructive of the life of grace. They are the slight aberrations of the will from the strait and narrow path of perfection, sufficient to incline the mind for a moment towards the creature, but insufficient to turn it away from the love of God and one’s neighbour, e.g. idle words, vain thoughts, and such-like. Some sins, of themselves mortal, become venial on account of the want of deliberation; for no sin, however grave materially, can be mortal if committed with imperfect knowledge or will. The words “all sins” in the above definition refer to all sins taken collectively. Taken separately, there is no venial sin that cannot be avoided. Again, the impossibility of avoiding all venial sins collectively, is not physical, but moral; in other words, the avoidance is of such difficulty that, knowing the ways (mores) of man, we feel sure that man will fail if left to himself.

1. All sins, mortal and venial, may only be avoided by a “special privilege,” distinct from the forces of nature to which Pelagius attributed such power; distinct from habitual grace, which does not make the just impeccable; distinct from the usual supply of habitual grace and from the grace of perseverance, both of which are compatible with venial sin. What is “special” about this privilege is that it constitutes an exception to the general rule: no man leads a perfectly sinless life.

2. The reason for the moral impossibility of a life entirely free from sin is to be found in the weakness of our nature and in the multitude of occasions of sin which surround us. It certainly passes the power of our mind to be so constantly on the watch against these occasions, as never to be caught unawares. And besides, we cannot help a certain feeling that the result to be obtained by such strained watchfulness is not commensurate with the labour it involves. Venial sins do not entail the loss of habitual grace or eternal punishment, and they are easily forgiven. Einig, De Gratia, thes. 10.

I. Another point in connection with the life of grace remains to be elucidated. The Pelagians maintained that a perfect, sinless life was possible by the mere powers of our nature. They considered the “perfection of justice” to consist in impeccancy or sinlessness and freedom from concupiscence. That doctrine was assailed by St. Augustine, and condemned by the Second Council of Milevis, and again by the Council of Trent. “If any one saith that man, being once justified, is able to avoid all sins, even venial, during all his life, without a special Divine privilege such as the Church holds was granted to the Blessed Virgin, let him be anathema” (sess. vi. can. 23).

II. The sins which even the just cannot always avoid, are not those known as mortal, or destructive of the life of grace. They are the slight aberrations of the will from the strait and narrow path of perfection, sufficient to incline the mind for a moment towards the creature, but insufficient to turn it away from the love of God and one’s neighbour, e.g. idle words, vain thoughts, and such-like. Some sins, of themselves mortal, become venial on account of the want of deliberation; for no sin, however grave materially, can be mortal if committed with imperfect knowledge or will. The words “all sins” in the above definition refer to all sins taken collectively. Taken separately, there is no venial sin that cannot be avoided. Again, the impossibility of avoiding all venial sins collectively, is not physical, but moral; in other words, the avoidance is of such difficulty that, knowing the ways (mores) of man, we feel sure that man will fail if left to himself.

1. All sins, mortal and venial, may only be avoided by a “special privilege,” distinct from the forces of nature to which Pelagius attributed such power; distinct from habitual grace, which does not make the just impeccable; distinct from the usual supply of habitual grace and from the grace of perseverance, both of which are compatible with venial sin. What is “special” about this privilege is that it constitutes an exception to the general rule: no man leads a perfectly sinless life.

2. The reason for the moral impossibility of a life entirely free from sin is to be found in the weakness of our nature and in the multitude of occasions of sin which surround us. It certainly passes the power of our mind to be so constantly on the watch against these occasions, as never to be caught unawares. And besides, we cannot help a certain feeling that the result to be obtained by such strained watchfulness is not commensurate with the labour it involves. Venial sins do not entail the loss of habitual grace or eternal punishment, and they are easily forgiven. Einig, De Gratia, thes. 10.

Seção 75% da obra, de A Manual of Catholic Theology (Wilhelm & Scannell, sobre a Dogmatik de Scheeben). Ver o original.