Sect. 56Our Conception of the Divine Essence and the Divine AttributesOur Conception of the Divine Essence and the Divine Attributes

I. As our natural knowledge of God is mediate and indirect, our knowledge of the Divine Essence cannot be intuitive—that is, resulting from direct intuition; nor can it be even equivalent to intuitive cognition—that is, reflecting the Divine Essence as It is in Itself purely and simply. The latter could be the case only if creatures were perfect images of the Creator, and also if, in addition, we had a perfect knowledge of their essences. Holy Scripture tells us that the vision of God, as He is, is promised as the reward of the sons of God in Heaven (1 John 3:2); and describes our present knowledge as a seeing through a glass in a dark manner (διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι) (1 Cor. 13:12).

II. An idea or conception of God as He really is, is impossible. Nevertheless, our idea of God is not simply negative and relative, showing merely what He is not and in what relations He stands to other beings. It is true, indeed, that the first element of our notion of Him is that He has none of the imperfections of finite things, and that He possesses the power to produce the perfections of creatures; yet, as these perfections are a reflection of His perfections, we are enabled to gather from them notions or conceptions of God, imperfect and indirect indeed, but still, at the same time, positive and truly representing the perfections belonging to the Divine Essence.

III. The perfections found in nature are but faint reproductions of the perfections of the Creator. Hence our natural conceptions, before they can be applied to the Divine Substance, must be purified of all imperfections, and must be enlarged and elevated so as to be made worthy of God (θεοπρεπεϊς). This “eminent sense,” as it is called, is expressed in the language of Holy Scripture and the Church in three ways: (1) The simplicity and substantiality of the Divine perfections are indicated by the use of abstract terms, e.g. by calling God not only good and wise, but also Goodness itself and Wisdom (αὐταγαθότης, αὐτοσοφία). (2) The infinite fulness of His perfections is expressed by adjectives with the prefix “all,” e.g. almighty, all-wise. (3) The intensity and super-eminent excellence of these perfections is pointed out by the prefix ὑπέρ, super, which may be expressed in English by the adverb “supremely,” e.g. supremely wise.

IV. The analogical value or the eminent signification is not the same in all conceptions. Some of the perfections of creatures can be conceived as divested of all imperfection, e.g. the transcendental attributes of unity, truth, goodness, force, and the attributes which go to make spiritual creatures the images of God. When these notions are applied to God they remain analogical indeed, but still they are used in a positive and proper sense, as opposed to a metaphorical, improper, or symbolical sense. But some natural perfections cannot be conceived without some imperfection adhering to them; they cannot therefore be predicated of God except in a symbolical and metaphorical sense, e.g. God is a lion, a rock, a fire, God is angry. Such metaphors, however, have a deeper meaning than ordinary metaphors, because they are founded upon the fact that the First Cause is reflected in every perfection of the creature. Perfections of the first kind are called “pure, and simple, and unadulterated perfections” (perfectiones simplices); the latter are called “mixed perfections”—that is, perfections combined with imperfection. The Greek Fathers designate the two classes and our corresponding knowledge of God by the expressions, κατηγορήματα τέλεια or ἀποδεικτικά, θεολογία ἀποδεικτική, for the first class, and κατηγορήματα ἀπόρρητα, or μυστικά and θεολογία συμβολική for the second. The two classes complete each other; the simple attributes enabling us to understand what is obscure and undetermined in the mixed attributes, and the latter giving a concreteness to the first.

IV. Theologians distinguish three ways of arriving at correct notions of God by means of the analogical conceptions gathered from natural perfections. The first is the Positive method, or the method of Causality (causa exemplaris), by which we consider the created perfection as an image and likeness of the corresponding Divine perfection. The second is the method of Negation, or removal (negationis seu remotionis), whereby we deny that certain perfections exist in God in the same manner as in creatures, viz., mixed with imperfection. The third is the method of Eminence (καθʼ ὑπεροχήν), which is a combination of the two preceding methods, and consists in conceiving the Divine perfections as of the most exalted character, and as having in themselves in a supreme degree whatever is perfect in creatures, without any admixture of imperfection. Hence there are three ways of predicating of God the perfections found in creatures. We can say: God is a spirit, God lives, God is rational; meaning that these perfections really exist in God. We can also say: God is not a spirit, is not living, is not rational; meaning that these perfections do not exist in God as they exist in creatures. To reconcile this seeming contradiction, the perfections should be predicated of God in the eminent sense: God is superspiritual, superrational. This doctrine is often expressed by the Fathers by saying that God is at the same time πανώνυμος, ἀνώνυμος, ὑπερώνυμος (all-names, nameless, above all names).

These three methods may be aptly compared with the methods of the three principal fine arts. The painter produces a picture by transferring colours to the canvas; the sculptor executes a statue by chipping away portions of a block of marble; while the poet strives to realize his ideal by the aid of metaphor and hyperbole.

The indirect and analogical character of our knowledge of God renders us unable to embrace in one idea all the perfections of the Divine Substance, or even the little that we can naturally know of them. We are obliged to combine several particular conceptions into one relatively complete representation. But the subject will be considered in the chapter on the unity and attributes of God.

V. The names which we give to things are the expression of our conceptions of those things. Hence what has been said concerning our conceptions of God applies to the names by which we designate them. Negative names exclude all idea of imperfection and represent God as a Being sui generis—which can alone be properly predicated of Him. All positive names transferred from the creature to the Creator are more or less improper names of Him, because they are not predicated of Creator and creature in exactly the same sense. Still, not being predicated of God in quite a different sense, they are not simply improper but analogical names. The most perfect among them are the names of pure or spiritual perfections, because they express perfections formally contained in Him. Although they are predicated of Him by way of eminence, still they belong to Him more than to creatures, because the perfections they express exist in God with more purity, fulness, reality, and truth than in creatures. For this reason they are sometimes attributed to Him exclusively: “Who alone is,” “One only is good, God.” The names of mixed perfections, especially specific names of material things can only be given to God in a metaphorical or symbolical sense.

VI. From what has been said it follows that the Divine Essence can neither be conceived or expressed by us as it really is in itself, but still that some conception and some expression of it are not beyond the power of our natural faculties—an absolute knowledge is impossible, a relative and imperfect knowledge is within our reach.

The doctrine contained in this section is beautifully expressed by St. Gregory of Nazianzum, in his “Hymn to God:”—

“In Thee all things do dwell, and tend

To Thee Who art their only End;

Thou art at once One, All, and None,

And yet Thou art not all or one.

All-name! by what name can I call

Thee, Nameless One, alone of all?”