Sect. 34Dogmatic CensuresDogmatic Censures
I. The Vatican Council has spoken of the right of censure belonging to the Church in the following terms: “Moreover, the Church having received, together with the apostolic office of teaching, the command to keep the Deposit of the Faith, hath also the right and the duty of proscribing knowledge falsely so-called, lest any one should be deceived by philosophy or vain deceit. Wherefore all the Faithful are forbidden, not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the Faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are also bound to hold them rather as errors having the deceitful semblance of truth” (sess. iii., chap. 4). See also Pius IX.’s brief Gravissimas inter.
II. Dogmatic censures impose most strictly the duty of unreserved assent. In matters of Faith and Morals they afford absolute certainty that the doctrines or propositions censured are to be rejected in the manner required by the particular censure affixed to them. Sometimes the obligation of submitting to the Church’s judgment is expressly mentioned; e.g. in the Bull Unigenitus: “We order all the Faithful not to presume to form opinions about these propositions or to teach or preach them, otherwise than is determined in this our constitution.” In cases of this kind the infallibility of the censures is contained in the infallibility concerning Faith and Morals which belongs to the Teaching Apostolate, because submission to the censure is made a moral duty. No difference is here made between the binding power of lesser censures and that of the highest (heresy). Moreover, these censures bind not only by reason of the obedience due to the Church, but also on account of the certain knowledge which they give us of the falsity or untrustworthiness of the censured doctrines. To adhere to these doctrines is a grievous sin because of the strictness of the ecclesiastical prohibition sanctioned by the heaviest penalties, and also because all or nearly all the censures represent the censured act as grievously sinful.
The duty to reject a censured doctrine involves the right to assert and duty to admit the contradictory doctrine as sound, nay as the only sound and legitimate doctrine. The censures do not expressly state this right and duty, nevertheless the consideration of the meaning and drift of each particular censure clearly establishes both. In the case of censures which express categorically the Church’s certain judgment, such as “Heresy,” “Error,” “False,” “Blasphemous,” “Impious,” and also in cases where moral certainty is expressed, such as “Akin to Heresy,” “Akin to Error,” “Rash,” there can be no question as to this. Doubt might perhaps arise whether the other censures, such as “Wicked,” “Unsound,” “Unsafe,” and mere condemnations without any particular qualification, impose the duty of admitting the falsity of the condemned doctrines as at least morally certain, or whether it is enough to abstain from maintaining them. As a rule, however, we must not be content with the latter.
III. The Church’s judgment is also infallible when condemning doctrines and propositions in the sense meant by some determinate author. This infallibility is already contained in the infallibility of the censure itself when no distinction can be drawn between the meaning of the words and the meaning intended by the author. But, where this distinction can be drawn, the infallibility of the judgment concerning the author’s meaning is at least virtually contained in the infallibility of the censure itself. The Church sometimes condemns an author’s propositions in the sense conveyed by their context, and sometimes formulates propositions conveying the author’s meaning. In the former case the censure applies to the context as well as to the proposition; in the latter case there is a twofold censure, one on the propositions as formulated by the judge, and another on the text as containing the sense of the propositions. In neither of these cases would the censure be infallible, if it were not infallible in determining the sense of the author. For this reason the Church does not give a separate judgment to establish that a particular text conveys a particular meaning; she simply attaches the censure to the text as it stands.
These various distinctions were of great importance in the Jansenistic controversy. The Jansenists admitted that the five propositions censured by Innocent X. were worthy of condemnation, but denied that they were to be found in their master’s works.
I. The Vatican Council has spoken of the right of censure belonging to the Church in the following terms: “Moreover, the Church having received, together with the apostolic office of teaching, the command to keep the Deposit of the Faith, hath also the right and the duty of proscribing knowledge falsely so-called, lest any one should be deceived by philosophy or vain deceit. Wherefore all the Faithful are forbidden, not only to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of the Faith, especially if they have been condemned by the Church, but are also bound to hold them rather as errors having the deceitful semblance of truth” (sess. iii., chap. 4). See also Pius IX.’s brief Gravissimas inter.
II. Dogmatic censures impose most strictly the duty of unreserved assent. In matters of Faith and Morals they afford absolute certainty that the doctrines or propositions censured are to be rejected in the manner required by the particular censure affixed to them. Sometimes the obligation of submitting to the Church’s judgment is expressly mentioned; e.g. in the Bull Unigenitus: “We order all the Faithful not to presume to form opinions about these propositions or to teach or preach them, otherwise than is determined in this our constitution.” In cases of this kind the infallibility of the censures is contained in the infallibility concerning Faith and Morals which belongs to the Teaching Apostolate, because submission to the censure is made a moral duty. No difference is here made between the binding power of lesser censures and that of the highest (heresy). Moreover, these censures bind not only by reason of the obedience due to the Church, but also on account of the certain knowledge which they give us of the falsity or untrustworthiness of the censured doctrines. To adhere to these doctrines is a grievous sin because of the strictness of the ecclesiastical prohibition sanctioned by the heaviest penalties, and also because all or nearly all the censures represent the censured act as grievously sinful.
The duty to reject a censured doctrine involves the right to assert and duty to admit the contradictory doctrine as sound, nay as the only sound and legitimate doctrine. The censures do not expressly state this right and duty, nevertheless the consideration of the meaning and drift of each particular censure clearly establishes both. In the case of censures which express categorically the Church’s certain judgment, such as “Heresy,” “Error,” “False,” “Blasphemous,” “Impious,” and also in cases where moral certainty is expressed, such as “Akin to Heresy,” “Akin to Error,” “Rash,” there can be no question as to this. Doubt might perhaps arise whether the other censures, such as “Wicked,” “Unsound,” “Unsafe,” and mere condemnations without any particular qualification, impose the duty of admitting the falsity of the condemned doctrines as at least morally certain, or whether it is enough to abstain from maintaining them. As a rule, however, we must not be content with the latter.
III. The Church’s judgment is also infallible when condemning doctrines and propositions in the sense meant by some determinate author. This infallibility is already contained in the infallibility of the censure itself when no distinction can be drawn between the meaning of the words and the meaning intended by the author. But, where this distinction can be drawn, the infallibility of the judgment concerning the author’s meaning is at least virtually contained in the infallibility of the censure itself. The Church sometimes condemns an author’s propositions in the sense conveyed by their context, and sometimes formulates propositions conveying the author’s meaning. In the former case the censure applies to the context as well as to the proposition; in the latter case there is a twofold censure, one on the propositions as formulated by the judge, and another on the text as containing the sense of the propositions. In neither of these cases would the censure be infallible, if it were not infallible in determining the sense of the author. For this reason the Church does not give a separate judgment to establish that a particular text conveys a particular meaning; she simply attaches the censure to the text as it stands.
These various distinctions were of great importance in the Jansenistic controversy. The Jansenists admitted that the five propositions censured by Innocent X. were worthy of condemnation, but denied that they were to be found in their master’s works.
Seção 12% da obra, de A Manual of Catholic Theology (Wilhelm & Scannell, sobre a Dogmatik de Scheeben). Ver o original.