Sect. 239The Nature of the Primacy of the Roman PontiffThe Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff

In the present section we shall point out more precisely the nature of the Primacy, the existence of which has already been abundantly proved. To understand this, we must bear in mind the threefold power exercised by our Lord, and transmitted by Him to His Church (supra, p. 288).

I. As regards Order, the Roman Pontiff has all the powers, and no more than the powers, of a bishop. If the newly elected Pope is not already a bishop, he must first be consecrated before being crowned. Nevertheless, even before consecration, he is really and truly the Pope, Supreme Head of the Church, able to decree, rule, name or depose bishops, and exercise every duty of pontifical jurisdiction (to be presently referred to); but he cannot ordain or consecrate till he has himself received the imposition of hands from other bishops, inferior to himself, and holding under and from him their sees and jurisdiction.

II. In the matter of jurisdiction the position of the Roman Pontiff is widely different from that of ordinary bishops, archbishops, or patriarchs. Their jurisdiction is dependent and limited: his is supreme and universal. To him alone the whole of Christ’s flock is entrusted; he holds the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, and the power of binding and loosing; and these functions come to him not from below, but from above—by succession to St. Peter, whom Christ Himself directly appointed. “The Roman Pontiff.” says the Council of Florence, “is the head of the whole Church, Father and Doctor of all Christians: to him [in the person of] blessed Peter was given full power of feeding, ruling, and governing the universal Church, as also (quemadmodum etiam) is contained in the acts of Ecumenical Councils and in the holy canons.” And the Vatican Council: “If any shall say that the Roman Pontiff hath the office merely of inspection or direction, and not full and supreme power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, not only in things which belong to faith and morals, but also in those which relate to the discipline and government of the Church spread through the world; or assert that he possesses merely the principal part (potiores partes), and not all the fulness of this supreme power; or that this power which he enjoys is not ordinary and immediate, both over each and all the Churches, and over each and all the pastors and the faithful: let him be anathema” (sess. iv. ch. 3). This latter Council takes care to note that the Primacy of the Pope in no way derogates from “the ordinary and immediate power of episcopal jurisdiction by which bishops, ‘who have been set by the Holy Ghost to succeed and hold the place of the Apostles,’ feed and govern each his own flock as true pastors.” Nay, rather that the authority is asserted and protected by the Primacy, according to the words of St. Gregory the Great, “My honour is the honour of the whole Church: my honour is the firm strength of my brethren. Then am I truly honoured when the honour due to each and all is not withheld” (Ep. ad Eulog. Alexandrin., lib. viii. ep. 30).

III. Just as his jurisdiction is supreme, so is the Pope’s teaching authority infallible. It will not be necessary, after what has been said in this chapter and vol. i. §§ 30, 31, to develop at any length the proof of this point. As St. Peter is the Rock of the Church, his faith must be the foundation of the Church’s faith: the gates of hell shall not prevail against her faith, because it is founded on his faith; he has the supreme power of binding and loosing, in which is especially contained supreme teaching authority; Christ’s prayer that Peter’s faith might not fail, and the duty imposed of confirming the brethren, show that the faith of the brethren was to depend upon Peter’s faith; the whole of Christ’s flock is entrusted to his care, to be fed by him with the genuine word of doctrine. And, as we have seen, the promises made to Peter and the powers conferred upon him apply equally to his successors, the Roman Pontiffs. The Vatican Council, completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople (869), the Second Council of Lyons (1274), and the Council of Florence (1438), and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas (519), thus defines Papal Infallibility: “The Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedrâ—that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, he defines a doctrine regarding Faith or Morals to be held by the Universal Church—by the Divine assistance promised to him in Blessed Peter, is possessed of that infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for defining doctrine regarding Faith or Morals; and therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves (ex sese), and not from the consent of the Church” (sess. iv. ch. 4).

Two main objections are brought against this doctrine—one negative and one positive—viz: (1) that it was not recognized or exercised in the early ages of the Church; and (2) that certain Popes have actually erred.

(a) In answer to the first of these objections, we may refer to the passages of the Fathers already quoted, and to the frequent appeals to Rome as early as the second century. Moreover, we may observe, with Cardinal Newman: “It is a less difficulty that the Papal supremacy was not formally acknowledged in the second century, than that there was no formal acknowledgment on the part of the Church of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity till the fourth. No doctrine is defined till it is violated. And, in like manner, it was natural for Christians to direct their course in matters of doctrine by the guidance of mere floating and, as it were, endemic tradition, while it was fresh and strong; but in proportion as it languished, or was broken in particular places, did it become necessary to fall back upon its special homes, first the Apostolic Sees, and then the See of St. Peter. Moreover, an international bond and common authority could not be consolidated, were it ever so certainly provided, while persecutions lasted. If the Imperial Power checked the development of the Councils, it availed also for keeping back the power of the Papacy. The Creed, the Canon, in like manner, both remained undefined. The Creed, the Canon, the Papacy, Ecumenical Councils, all began to form as soon as the Empire relaxed its tyrannous oppression of the Church. And as it was natural that her monarchical power should display itself when the Empire became Christian, so was it natural also that further developments of that power should take place when the Empire fell” (Newman, Development, p. 151, 6th ed.).

(b) As regards the Popes who are said to have erred, it may be answered generally that any such erroneous teaching is not ex cathedrâ; that is to say, it does not fulfil the conditions required by the Vatican definition (see § 31). Thus, the conduct of Liberius in purchasing his return from exile by condemning Athanasius and subscribing a semi-Arian creed, cannot be urged against infallibility. He did not “define any doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the Universal Church:” what he did he did under compulsion, and as soon as he was free to speak he confirmed the orthodox Council of Alexandria. As St. Athanasius himself says, “Liberius, being exiled, later on, after a period of two years gave way (ὤκλασε), and in fear of the death with which he was threatened, subscribed. But even this shows their violence, and the hatred of Liberius against the heresy, and his decision for Athanasius when his will was free. For things done through torments contrary to the original judgment—these are not acts of will on the part of those who have been put to fear, but of those who inflict the torture” (Epist. ad Monach. et Hist. Arian., 41). See Card. Newman, Arians, pp. 314, 334; Catholic Dictionary, LIBERIUS; Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 637.

The condemnation of Pope Honorius (625–638) by the Sixth General Council (Third Constantinople, 680), and the confirmatory letter of Leo. II. anathematizing “Honorius, who did not endeavour to sanctify this Apostolic Church by teaching of Apostolic tradition, but permitted the spotless one to be defiled by unholy betrayal,” certainly present some difficulty. We cannot here discuss the question at any length; we must content ourselves with stating what would seem to be the best answer. First, then, the teaching of Honorius was not erroneous. What he held was that there were not two contrary wills in Christ: Our Lord’s action was morally one. St. Maximus, the most determined opponent of Monothelitism, regards him and his expressions as perfectly orthodox. Why, then, was he condemned? Because this doctrine served as a cloak to the Monothelite heresy, especially as he declared that it was foolish to speak of one operation or two operations, and that it was better to leave such subtleties to the grammarians. Leo II., at any rate, condemned him only in this sense. “The crafty Byzantine, Sergius, put the unsuspecting Pope (Honorius) on a false scent, and elicited from him a letter which he was enabled to misuse for his own purpose, and indeed in favour of a heresy advocated by himself, but then totally unknown to the pontiff. These expectations were crowned with success. The expressions of Honorius, as could not fail to happen, were set up by the Greeks in connection with the question then so warmly agitated; and so, as the Byzantines (at the Council of Constantinople) required, to whom the condemnation of so many of their patriarchs was excessively irksome and displeasing, Honorius likewise was condemned” (Hergenröther, Anti-Janus, Eng. trans., p. 80. See supra, p. 83; Franzelin, De Verbo Incarn., p. 396 sqq.; Palmieri, De Rom. Pont., p. 655 sqq.).

On the Primacy of the Pope see Palmieri, op. cit., 319 sqq.; Billot, De Eccl., 586 sqq.; Atzberger, op. cit., sect. 343; Turmel, op. cit., p. 228 sqq.; Histoire du Dogme de la Papauté.