Sect. 229On Predestination (After St. Thomas, 1 P. Q. 23)On Predestination (After St. Thomas, 1 P. Q. 23)
I. Predestination is Divine Providence (cf. § 116), leading rational creatures to their supernatural end, the Beatific Vision. Things in general attain their natural end by the working of the power that is proper to each of them; but man has not in him power sufficient to attain to the vision of God. He is made to reach his destination by a special assistance from his Maker. The way and manner of this special assistance pre-exist in the Divine mind, and constitute predestination. Predestination, then, is not a quality or an accident of the creature, but an idea of the Eternal mind, like Providence. It is carried into effect, in time, by the vocation and glorification of the predestinated. “… And whom He predestinated (προώρισεν), them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified” (Rom. 8:30).
II. Not all rational creatures attain the supernatural end to which they are called. It is in the nature of Providence to allow defects and shortcomings in particular parts of the universe, so as to make them conducive to the perfection, and subservient to the final object, of the whole. When God allows individuals to fall away from Him, He is said to “reprobate” them. Reprobation, therefore, implies, on the part of the Divine Providence, the will—first, to allow some to fall into sin; and secondly, to restore the disturbed order by adequate punishment of the sinner.
III. The two aspects of Providence called predestination and reprobation differ greatly in their way of influencing man. Predestination is the cause both of eternal glory and of the graces which lead to it. Reprobation is not the cause of sin, but this latter causes the sinner to be abandoned by God, and to be eternally punished. The cause of sin is man’s imperfect free will (cf. § 114, ii.).
IV. “He chose us in Him (= God in Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children …” (Eph. 1:4, 5). Here, and in other places, Scripture speaks of choice (election) and of predestination as synonymous. As a matter of fact, all the predestinated are elected, and specially beloved by God, for predestination follows upon election, and election upon love. The act by which God wills the eternal salvation of some is an act of love, for it confers the greatest good upon the creature. It is also an act of election, or choice, because whilst given to some it is withheld from others. To our finite minds it. appears as an act of most gratuitous benevolence (dilectio), choosing some rational creatures, in preference to others, to be made partakers of eternal salvation.
V. This eternal act of the Divine will has no cause but the Divine goodness. But if no cause can be assigned to it in itself, a cause or causes may be assigned to its effects, inasmuch as God wills one effect to be the cause of another. Taking the effects separately—grace, good works, beatific vision—we may say that the volition of the beatific vision causes the volition of good works and grace; and that grace and good works are the meritorious cause of the beatific vision. But if we take the effects of predestination as one whole, they cannot have any cause in ourselves, for whatever in man makes for salvation is itself an effect of his predestination. The whole process has its reason in the Divine will, from which it receives its first impulse and its final completion.
VI. The above doctrine is laid down with great clearness and stress by St. Paul. Having stated that predestination is not “of works, but of Him that calleth,” he raises an objection: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” And he answers, “God forbid!” and restates the same doctrine and rebukes the objector in these terms: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it: Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom. 9:12–20). Now, in the Divine goodness itself may be found a reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. God made all things that they should be some expression of His goodness. But a Divine attribute, one and simple in itself, can only be represented by multiple and inadequate expressions: created things do not attain the Divine simplicity. And hence, in the universe there must be creatures of high and of low degree, and to this end God permits some evil in order that much good may come of it. In mankind, from this point of view. God willed that His goodness should be expressed as mercy and pardon in the predestinated, and as justice in the reprobate. This is the reason given by the Apostle: “God, willing to show His wrath (= vindictive justice) and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” (Rom. 9:22, 23; cf. 2 Tim. 2:20). No reason, however, other than the simple Divine will, can be given for the election of the vessels of mercy and the rejection of the vessels of wrath. Nor does this imply an injustice on the part of God. If He was bound to give the same grace to all, grace would not be a free gift. Being a free gift, God distributes it freely, as did the householder of the parable: “Take what is thine, and go thy way: I will also give to this last, even as to thee” (Matt. 20:14).
VII. A large number of Jesuit theologians, known as Congruists, hold, like the Thomists, an absolute predestination to glory, irrespective of merits foreseen. God gives to the predestinate the same grace as to the reprobate; but to the former in circumstances under which He foresees they will accept it, to the latter in those under which He foresees they will not do so. Such was the opinion of Suarez (after his return to Spain), of Bellarmine, Antoine, and many others. Another large number of Jesuits, e.g. Toletus, Maldonatus, Lessius, Vasquez, Valentia, and Suarez (while he taught at Rome), admit that predestination to grace, but deny that predestination to glory, is irrespective of merit foreseen. God decrees, they say, to give grace to all, and predestinates those who, as He foresees, will correspond to it, the rest being reprobate (Cath. Dict., art. “Predestination”). The mind of St. Thomas on this subject is expressed in the passage we are analyzing in this section. “Some have said that the merits consequent upon the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination, meaning that God gives grace, and decrees to give it, to such as He foresees will make good use of it—after the manner of a king who gives a horse to the soldier of whom he knows that he will use it well. But these (theologians) seem to have made a distinction between what comes of grace and what comes of free will, as if the same (act) could not proceed from both grace and free will. It is, however, manifest that whatever is owing to grace is an effect of predestination, and cannot be its reason (or cause). If something of ours be the reason of predestination, this something must not be an effect of the same. But there is no distinction between the work of free will and that of predestination, any more than between the work of the second (created) cause and the first. For Divine Providence produces effects through the operation of second causes. Hence whatever is done through free will is done through predestination” (1 q. 23, a. 5 c.; cf. § 88).
VIII. Predestination infallibly attains its object, viz. the eternal salvation of the predestinated, yet not so as to deprive them of their free will. It is but a department of Divine Providence which rules the world of spirit and matter with an infallible hand, working freely in the free, and on unbending lines in the unfree: always according to the nature of each cause (cf. § 88).
IX. Can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the just? Some have thought that prayers and good works are useless to the predestinate as well as to the reprobate, on account of the infallibility of the Divine decree. But God in the Scriptures constantly exhorts us to prayer and good works. On the other hand, the opinion has been advanced that sacrifices and prayers have the power to change the Divine purpose. Against this, too, we have the authority of Scripture: “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance” (Rom. 11:29); “the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent” (1 Kings 15:29). Two things must be distinguished in predestination: the Divine decree, and its effects. The Divine decree is not influenced by the prayers of the saints. But its effects, viz. the distribution of grace, good works, eternal glory, are so influenced, because Providence works with and through created causes to which prayers and good works belong. Although many gifts are received that have not been prayed for, yet others are not given except in answer to prayers. Hence we read: “Ask, and it shall be given unto you” (Matt. 7:7); “Brethren, labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. 1:10); and St. Augustine rightly says, “If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have Paul.”
I. Predestination is Divine Providence (cf. § 116), leading rational creatures to their supernatural end, the Beatific Vision. Things in general attain their natural end by the working of the power that is proper to each of them; but man has not in him power sufficient to attain to the vision of God. He is made to reach his destination by a special assistance from his Maker. The way and manner of this special assistance pre-exist in the Divine mind, and constitute predestination. Predestination, then, is not a quality or an accident of the creature, but an idea of the Eternal mind, like Providence. It is carried into effect, in time, by the vocation and glorification of the predestinated. “… And whom He predestinated (προώρισεν), them He also called. And whom He called, them He also justified. And whom He justified, them He also glorified” (Rom. 8:30).
II. Not all rational creatures attain the supernatural end to which they are called. It is in the nature of Providence to allow defects and shortcomings in particular parts of the universe, so as to make them conducive to the perfection, and subservient to the final object, of the whole. When God allows individuals to fall away from Him, He is said to “reprobate” them. Reprobation, therefore, implies, on the part of the Divine Providence, the will—first, to allow some to fall into sin; and secondly, to restore the disturbed order by adequate punishment of the sinner.
III. The two aspects of Providence called predestination and reprobation differ greatly in their way of influencing man. Predestination is the cause both of eternal glory and of the graces which lead to it. Reprobation is not the cause of sin, but this latter causes the sinner to be abandoned by God, and to be eternally punished. The cause of sin is man’s imperfect free will (cf. § 114, ii.).
IV. “He chose us in Him (= God in Christ) before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and unspotted in His sight in charity. Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children …” (Eph. 1:4, 5). Here, and in other places, Scripture speaks of choice (election) and of predestination as synonymous. As a matter of fact, all the predestinated are elected, and specially beloved by God, for predestination follows upon election, and election upon love. The act by which God wills the eternal salvation of some is an act of love, for it confers the greatest good upon the creature. It is also an act of election, or choice, because whilst given to some it is withheld from others. To our finite minds it. appears as an act of most gratuitous benevolence (dilectio), choosing some rational creatures, in preference to others, to be made partakers of eternal salvation.
V. This eternal act of the Divine will has no cause but the Divine goodness. But if no cause can be assigned to it in itself, a cause or causes may be assigned to its effects, inasmuch as God wills one effect to be the cause of another. Taking the effects separately—grace, good works, beatific vision—we may say that the volition of the beatific vision causes the volition of good works and grace; and that grace and good works are the meritorious cause of the beatific vision. But if we take the effects of predestination as one whole, they cannot have any cause in ourselves, for whatever in man makes for salvation is itself an effect of his predestination. The whole process has its reason in the Divine will, from which it receives its first impulse and its final completion.
VI. The above doctrine is laid down with great clearness and stress by St. Paul. Having stated that predestination is not “of works, but of Him that calleth,” he raises an objection: “What shall we say then? Is there injustice with God?” And he answers, “God forbid!” and restates the same doctrine and rebukes the objector in these terms: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to Him that formed it: Why hast Thou made me thus?” (Rom. 9:12–20). Now, in the Divine goodness itself may be found a reason for the predestination of some and the reprobation of others. God made all things that they should be some expression of His goodness. But a Divine attribute, one and simple in itself, can only be represented by multiple and inadequate expressions: created things do not attain the Divine simplicity. And hence, in the universe there must be creatures of high and of low degree, and to this end God permits some evil in order that much good may come of it. In mankind, from this point of view. God willed that His goodness should be expressed as mercy and pardon in the predestinated, and as justice in the reprobate. This is the reason given by the Apostle: “God, willing to show His wrath (= vindictive justice) and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” (Rom. 9:22, 23; cf. 2 Tim. 2:20). No reason, however, other than the simple Divine will, can be given for the election of the vessels of mercy and the rejection of the vessels of wrath. Nor does this imply an injustice on the part of God. If He was bound to give the same grace to all, grace would not be a free gift. Being a free gift, God distributes it freely, as did the householder of the parable: “Take what is thine, and go thy way: I will also give to this last, even as to thee” (Matt. 20:14).
VII. A large number of Jesuit theologians, known as Congruists, hold, like the Thomists, an absolute predestination to glory, irrespective of merits foreseen. God gives to the predestinate the same grace as to the reprobate; but to the former in circumstances under which He foresees they will accept it, to the latter in those under which He foresees they will not do so. Such was the opinion of Suarez (after his return to Spain), of Bellarmine, Antoine, and many others. Another large number of Jesuits, e.g. Toletus, Maldonatus, Lessius, Vasquez, Valentia, and Suarez (while he taught at Rome), admit that predestination to grace, but deny that predestination to glory, is irrespective of merit foreseen. God decrees, they say, to give grace to all, and predestinates those who, as He foresees, will correspond to it, the rest being reprobate (Cath. Dict., art. “Predestination”). The mind of St. Thomas on this subject is expressed in the passage we are analyzing in this section. “Some have said that the merits consequent upon the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination, meaning that God gives grace, and decrees to give it, to such as He foresees will make good use of it—after the manner of a king who gives a horse to the soldier of whom he knows that he will use it well. But these (theologians) seem to have made a distinction between what comes of grace and what comes of free will, as if the same (act) could not proceed from both grace and free will. It is, however, manifest that whatever is owing to grace is an effect of predestination, and cannot be its reason (or cause). If something of ours be the reason of predestination, this something must not be an effect of the same. But there is no distinction between the work of free will and that of predestination, any more than between the work of the second (created) cause and the first. For Divine Providence produces effects through the operation of second causes. Hence whatever is done through free will is done through predestination” (1 q. 23, a. 5 c.; cf. § 88).
VIII. Predestination infallibly attains its object, viz. the eternal salvation of the predestinated, yet not so as to deprive them of their free will. It is but a department of Divine Providence which rules the world of spirit and matter with an infallible hand, working freely in the free, and on unbending lines in the unfree: always according to the nature of each cause (cf. § 88).
IX. Can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the just? Some have thought that prayers and good works are useless to the predestinate as well as to the reprobate, on account of the infallibility of the Divine decree. But God in the Scriptures constantly exhorts us to prayer and good works. On the other hand, the opinion has been advanced that sacrifices and prayers have the power to change the Divine purpose. Against this, too, we have the authority of Scripture: “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance” (Rom. 11:29); “the triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent” (1 Kings 15:29). Two things must be distinguished in predestination: the Divine decree, and its effects. The Divine decree is not influenced by the prayers of the saints. But its effects, viz. the distribution of grace, good works, eternal glory, are so influenced, because Providence works with and through created causes to which prayers and good works belong. Although many gifts are received that have not been prayed for, yet others are not given except in answer to prayers. Hence we read: “Ask, and it shall be given unto you” (Matt. 7:7); “Brethren, labour the more, that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. 1:10); and St. Augustine rightly says, “If Stephen had not prayed, the Church would not have Paul.”
Seção 78% da obra, de A Manual of Catholic Theology (Wilhelm & Scannell, sobre a Dogmatik de Scheeben). Ver o original.