Sect. 177The Hypostatic Union, from the Point of View of the Assuming PrincipleThe Hypostatic Union, from the Point of View of the Assuming Principle

I. The notion of a union purely hypostatic implies that a Divine Person, as distinct from the Divine Nature, is the subject and the terminus of the assumption of humanity. It is wrong to say that “the Divine Nature” was made man, except the term “nature” be taken for self-subsisting nature or person, as is often done by the Fathers. The possibility of the Person—with exclusion of His nature—being the formal terminus of the hypostatic union, is founded upon the virtual distinction between the Divine Nature and the Divine Persons: we can conceive that a Person took flesh, or that flesh was assumed by the Person and not by the nature, if we bear in mind that “to be” a Person really identical with the Divine Nature and “to act” as a Person are not formally the same thing. The real identity of Person and Nature entails, however, as a consequence, that the human and Divine Natures become intimately united in the Hypostatic Union.

II. It is an express article of faith that only one Person was made man, viz. the Second. The possibility of such a separate union rests upon the distinction between the Divine Persons. As the Divine substance is possessed in three distinct ways by the distinct Holders, we can understand that One of them may possess the human nature exclusively to Himself by giving it the benefit of His own subsistence. However, the unity of Nature in the three Divine Persons causes “the plenitude of Divinity to dwell corporeally” in the Incarnate Person. Thus, especially, the Holy Ghost is present in Christ as His Spirit; and Christ is in the Holy Ghost as His temple in a manner essentially superior to the indwelling by created grace in the just. Likewise the humanity of Christ is in the bosom of the Father, and the Father in Him as in His image, in a manner infinitely superior to what grace effects in the sanctified. The special indwelling of the Father and the Holy Ghost in Christ is technically called “presence by concomitancy.”

The fact that the Second Person, rather than any other, was incarnate, is to be accounted for by reasons of congruency connected with the hypostatic character of God the Son, and with the object of Incarnation. Cf. St. Thomas, 3 q. 3, a. 8; and St. Bonaventure, Breviloq. l. iv. c. 2.

III. The assumption of a second nature supposes in the assuming person a special perfection. The person, as principle or efficient cause of the Hypostatic Union, requires a special power over the lower nature; as terminus of the union, He requires a special exaltedness in His mode of existence, sufficient to intrinsically perfect, pervade, and rule the assumed nature. It is certain that a Divine Person, by reason of His nature, possesses such power and exaltedness: according to St. Thomas, a Divine person alone can possess them. All theologians agree in requiring “Divine” power to effect a Hypostatic Union; an angel can no more unite to himself another spiritual nature than he can unite soul and body into one human person and nature. The assuming principle must necessarily be of a higher order than the assumed, and, if the lower be a spirit, according to the common teaching of the Church, God alone can penetrate, pervade, control, and govern it in the way supposed in Hypostatic Union: the searching of hearts is the exclusive privilege of God. In the same way, the power of existing in two spiritual natures is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Persons, just as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Divine Nature to subsist in several distinct Persons. The first prerogative is founded upon the absolute Highness, the second upon the absolute Riches, and both upon the infinite Perfection of the Divine Substance in general, and especially on its self-sufficiency and power.

IV. Considered in relation to the Divine Persons, the Hypostatic Union is made possible by, and is a manifestation of, God’s infinite perfection. Hence it involves no contradiction to any of the Divine perfections. It is not incompatible with the Divine simplicity, because it implies neither an intrinsic composition of the Divine substance, nor does it reduce it to be part of a whole of higher value. It is not against God’s infinity, because it involves no increase of His perfection, but merely an external manifestation of the riches of that perfection. It is not opposed to the Divine immutability, because it is not a new mode of existence affecting the Divine substance intrinsically. In short, these three Divine perfections could only be affected by entering into a relation of dependency or passivity towards the assumed nature; but the fact is exactly the reverse: the relation of God to the assumed nature is one of active completion, possession, and dominion, and in all points analogous to the relation of God to His creatures. See St. Thomas, 3, q. 3; Franzelin, theses xxxii. and xxxiii.