Sect. 173The Existence of One Divine Person or Hypostasis in Two Perfect Natures, as Taught by the Church Against MonophysitismThe Existence of One Divine Person or Hypostasis in Two Perfect Natures, as Taught by the Church Against Monophysitism
I. The substantial and physical union of the human with the Divine Substance in Christ, so clearly defined by the Church against Nestorius, was misinterpreted by Eutyches as implying confusion of the two natures into one, after the manner of natural compounds, in which two elements are combined into a third, different from each of the components. The original form of this heresy compared the effect of the union of the two natures to a mixture in which one element, inferior in quantity or quality, is absorbed by the other superior element so as to lose its own essence, e.g. a drop of honey thrown into the sea, or a drop of water poured into a great quantity of wine. A later form was less crude. Its authors illustrated their idea by the analogy of gold and silver turned into amber (electrum) by mixture (σύγχυσις, con-fusio). The last and more refined form of Monophysitism conceived the unity of nature in Christ as similar to the unity of nature in man, that is, as a compound nature in which both component elements retain their proper essence, yet so as mutually to modify their essential properties. But in this form, as well as in the first and second, an alteration of the combined elements must necessarily be conceded, and this is the fundamental error of the whole system. Its consequences chiefly appear in determining the share of the Divine and human substances in the Passion. According to some, human nature lost all passibility through the unions; according to others, the Divine nature became passible.
II. Pope St. Leo I. (Epist. ad Flavianum), and afterwards the Council of Chalcedon, defined against Eutyches and his followers that the human substance, after its union with the Divine, retained its nature and essence as, of course, does the Divine substance; whence Christ is not the product of two natures, but exists in two distinct natures. This dogma was inferred from the fact that Christ is really and truly man as well as God, consubstantial with both God and man, which He could not be if, in the union, the human substance had lost its essence or nature. St. Leo appeals to the text Phil. 2:6, 7: “Who, being in the form of God … took the form of servant,” in order to be perfectly like unto man; and repeatedly insists upon the Divine and human attributes being predicated of Christ as one subject: a fictitious human nature in Christ is consistent neither with the truth of these attributes nor with the reality of the work of Redemption. He takes the terms “form” or “nature” in the sense of principles of action, viz. that which in a substance causes it to act as it acts. The influence of the unity of Person on the activity of the natures he limits to this: that neither nature can act or suffer except in union with the other.
III. The Council of Chalcedon, following St. Leo, declared that Christ exists in two indivisible and inseparable, but, at the same time, unchanged and unconfused natures, the indivisible and inseparable unity of Person in no wise destroying the distinction or properties of the natures. It was easy to prove that no essential change had taken place in the natures by the union, not only from the fact that both remained perfect in their kind after the union, but also from scientific principles. The Divine Nature evidently admits of no intrinsic change whatsoever. Human nature, taken as a body informed by a spiritual soul, is, speaking absolutely, destructible, but not miscible with another substance so as to lose essential form or properties. Again, how could God destroy the very nature He came to redeem? Its imperfections could be removed without injuring its essence, but even some of these, e.g. passibility, were necessary for the accomplishment of Redemption. The possibility of the two natures being so closely united without abasement of the Divine Nature or essential alteration of the human, is explained on the ground of God’s absolute power, and of His absolute freedom to manifest the power ad extra. On account of His absolute power, the Divinity can contract no union through which that power would be damaged in any way; on account of His absolute freedom in the use of His power, the influence of the Divine on the human element is not exerted with physical necessity, like that of the soul on the body, but according to the decrees of the Divine Wisdom and Will (Leo I., Ep. ad Jul. Coensem).
IV. The analogy of the substantial union of body and soul—used by St. Cyril against Nestorius to illustrate how two essentially different substances can coalesce into one total substance—was again made use of by the Fathers, and even in the Athanasian Symbol against Mono-physitism; in order to show how, notwithstanding this most intimate union, two substances can retain their own, though opposite, qualities. The analogy carried sufficient weight against the first and grosser forms of the heresy, but, at the same time, it gave rise to the last and more refined form: accepting the comparison, the adversaries inferred from it that in Christ, as in other men, the union of the two substances resulted in “one nature.” Hence the necessity of a deeper study of the human compound of soul and body. The line of defence set up on the Catholic side may be traced as follows: In a certain sense, there are two natures in man, the spiritual and the animal. Granting that these two are merged into one compound nature, it does not follow that in Christ likewise the Divine and human natures are merged into one compound, different from either of the components. There is no similarity in the result of the union, because there is none in the component elements. Christ is the Logos, the uncreated Spirit, with His flesh animated by a rational soul; man is a created spirit, with his flesh animated by that spirit. On both sides, the term “spirit and his flesh” indicates a personal union. Whereas, however, in man the fact that his own spirit informs his flesh leads to unity of nature as well as to personal unity, in Christ the fact that not the Logos, but a created soul, informs His flesh, prevents the unity of nature, and the union stops at the unity of Person. For a similar reason, there are virtually two natures even in man: the entire life of the spirit is not absorbed in its union with the body; it retains its peculiarities side by side and above the animal life (Rom. 7). But in Christ the distinction of natures is real, because the Divine Spirit is not the principle of the life of the body. If in His case there was a unity or fusion of natures, two spirits ought to coalesce in one like two material bodies: this, however, is absurd, because it implies the possibility of a spirit being degraded to the rank of matter. The reason, then, why the union in Christ is purely personal (whereas in man it is personal and material) is the different perfection of the united substances: the lower substance is an incomplete nature in man, a complete one in Christ; in man the higher substance is not perfectly independent or self-sufficient, because as principle of life it depends on the co-operation of the lower substance; in Christ, on the contrary, it is absolutely independent and self-sufficient, and has even the power to appropriate to itself another spiritual substance.
V. The Monophysites appealed to the phrase of St. Cyril: “One, incarnate, nature of the word” (μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη) as favouring their heresy. But St. Cyril himself (Ep. ad Acacium Melit.) shows that he takes the term “nature” as equivalent to “hypostasis,” and the Fifth Council, in its eighth canon, explains the phrase as meaning “that (out) of the Divine nature and the human, being united hypostatically, one Christ was constituted.” Against Nestorius the Fathers had to show that the inferior substance passes on to the superior and becomes His own, so that God, on this account, is also man. But this could be shown without distinguishing in the Divine substance the hypostasis or Person from His essence or nature: there was then no reason for avoiding the promiscuous use of the term Person and nature to designate the Divine Substance as existing concretely in the Logos. Against Eutyches, however, it was necessary to insist upon the existence of Christ in two coexisting forms, according to Phil. 2:6, 7. Hence the Person or Hypostasis had to be distinguished from the essence or nature of the Logos as its Holder and Bearer, Who, in the Incarnation, became the Holder and Bearer of a second essence and nature. See Petavius, De Incar., iv. 6; Newman, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, p. 285 sqq.
I. The substantial and physical union of the human with the Divine Substance in Christ, so clearly defined by the Church against Nestorius, was misinterpreted by Eutyches as implying confusion of the two natures into one, after the manner of natural compounds, in which two elements are combined into a third, different from each of the components. The original form of this heresy compared the effect of the union of the two natures to a mixture in which one element, inferior in quantity or quality, is absorbed by the other superior element so as to lose its own essence, e.g. a drop of honey thrown into the sea, or a drop of water poured into a great quantity of wine. A later form was less crude. Its authors illustrated their idea by the analogy of gold and silver turned into amber (electrum) by mixture (σύγχυσις, con-fusio). The last and more refined form of Monophysitism conceived the unity of nature in Christ as similar to the unity of nature in man, that is, as a compound nature in which both component elements retain their proper essence, yet so as mutually to modify their essential properties. But in this form, as well as in the first and second, an alteration of the combined elements must necessarily be conceded, and this is the fundamental error of the whole system. Its consequences chiefly appear in determining the share of the Divine and human substances in the Passion. According to some, human nature lost all passibility through the unions; according to others, the Divine nature became passible.
II. Pope St. Leo I. (Epist. ad Flavianum), and afterwards the Council of Chalcedon, defined against Eutyches and his followers that the human substance, after its union with the Divine, retained its nature and essence as, of course, does the Divine substance; whence Christ is not the product of two natures, but exists in two distinct natures. This dogma was inferred from the fact that Christ is really and truly man as well as God, consubstantial with both God and man, which He could not be if, in the union, the human substance had lost its essence or nature. St. Leo appeals to the text Phil. 2:6, 7: “Who, being in the form of God … took the form of servant,” in order to be perfectly like unto man; and repeatedly insists upon the Divine and human attributes being predicated of Christ as one subject: a fictitious human nature in Christ is consistent neither with the truth of these attributes nor with the reality of the work of Redemption. He takes the terms “form” or “nature” in the sense of principles of action, viz. that which in a substance causes it to act as it acts. The influence of the unity of Person on the activity of the natures he limits to this: that neither nature can act or suffer except in union with the other.
III. The Council of Chalcedon, following St. Leo, declared that Christ exists in two indivisible and inseparable, but, at the same time, unchanged and unconfused natures, the indivisible and inseparable unity of Person in no wise destroying the distinction or properties of the natures. It was easy to prove that no essential change had taken place in the natures by the union, not only from the fact that both remained perfect in their kind after the union, but also from scientific principles. The Divine Nature evidently admits of no intrinsic change whatsoever. Human nature, taken as a body informed by a spiritual soul, is, speaking absolutely, destructible, but not miscible with another substance so as to lose essential form or properties. Again, how could God destroy the very nature He came to redeem? Its imperfections could be removed without injuring its essence, but even some of these, e.g. passibility, were necessary for the accomplishment of Redemption. The possibility of the two natures being so closely united without abasement of the Divine Nature or essential alteration of the human, is explained on the ground of God’s absolute power, and of His absolute freedom to manifest the power ad extra. On account of His absolute power, the Divinity can contract no union through which that power would be damaged in any way; on account of His absolute freedom in the use of His power, the influence of the Divine on the human element is not exerted with physical necessity, like that of the soul on the body, but according to the decrees of the Divine Wisdom and Will (Leo I., Ep. ad Jul. Coensem).
IV. The analogy of the substantial union of body and soul—used by St. Cyril against Nestorius to illustrate how two essentially different substances can coalesce into one total substance—was again made use of by the Fathers, and even in the Athanasian Symbol against Mono-physitism; in order to show how, notwithstanding this most intimate union, two substances can retain their own, though opposite, qualities. The analogy carried sufficient weight against the first and grosser forms of the heresy, but, at the same time, it gave rise to the last and more refined form: accepting the comparison, the adversaries inferred from it that in Christ, as in other men, the union of the two substances resulted in “one nature.” Hence the necessity of a deeper study of the human compound of soul and body. The line of defence set up on the Catholic side may be traced as follows: In a certain sense, there are two natures in man, the spiritual and the animal. Granting that these two are merged into one compound nature, it does not follow that in Christ likewise the Divine and human natures are merged into one compound, different from either of the components. There is no similarity in the result of the union, because there is none in the component elements. Christ is the Logos, the uncreated Spirit, with His flesh animated by a rational soul; man is a created spirit, with his flesh animated by that spirit. On both sides, the term “spirit and his flesh” indicates a personal union. Whereas, however, in man the fact that his own spirit informs his flesh leads to unity of nature as well as to personal unity, in Christ the fact that not the Logos, but a created soul, informs His flesh, prevents the unity of nature, and the union stops at the unity of Person. For a similar reason, there are virtually two natures even in man: the entire life of the spirit is not absorbed in its union with the body; it retains its peculiarities side by side and above the animal life (Rom. 7). But in Christ the distinction of natures is real, because the Divine Spirit is not the principle of the life of the body. If in His case there was a unity or fusion of natures, two spirits ought to coalesce in one like two material bodies: this, however, is absurd, because it implies the possibility of a spirit being degraded to the rank of matter. The reason, then, why the union in Christ is purely personal (whereas in man it is personal and material) is the different perfection of the united substances: the lower substance is an incomplete nature in man, a complete one in Christ; in man the higher substance is not perfectly independent or self-sufficient, because as principle of life it depends on the co-operation of the lower substance; in Christ, on the contrary, it is absolutely independent and self-sufficient, and has even the power to appropriate to itself another spiritual substance.
V. The Monophysites appealed to the phrase of St. Cyril: “One, incarnate, nature of the word” (μία φύσις σεσαρκωμένη) as favouring their heresy. But St. Cyril himself (Ep. ad Acacium Melit.) shows that he takes the term “nature” as equivalent to “hypostasis,” and the Fifth Council, in its eighth canon, explains the phrase as meaning “that (out) of the Divine nature and the human, being united hypostatically, one Christ was constituted.” Against Nestorius the Fathers had to show that the inferior substance passes on to the superior and becomes His own, so that God, on this account, is also man. But this could be shown without distinguishing in the Divine substance the hypostasis or Person from His essence or nature: there was then no reason for avoiding the promiscuous use of the term Person and nature to designate the Divine Substance as existing concretely in the Logos. Against Eutyches, however, it was necessary to insist upon the existence of Christ in two coexisting forms, according to Phil. 2:6, 7. Hence the Person or Hypostasis had to be distinguished from the essence or nature of the Logos as its Holder and Bearer, Who, in the Incarnation, became the Holder and Bearer of a second essence and nature. See Petavius, De Incar., iv. 6; Newman, Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical, p. 285 sqq.
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