Sect. 163The Sin of Adam in His DescendantsThe Sin of Adam in His Descendants

I. An adequate, positive definition of original sin has not been given by the Church. The definitions, however, concerning the existence of original sin, and the necessity and efficacy of Baptism, give the theologian sufficient elements for determining the real nature of original sin in fallen man. We quote the Council of Trent (sess. v. can. 5): “If any one deny that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is given in baptism, the guilt (reatus) of original sin is remitted; or if he assert that not all that is taken away which has the true and proper nature (rationem) of sin, but that it is only erased or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in the regenerated there is nothing hateful to God: … That, however, in the baptized there remains concupiscence or the fomes, is the sense of this Holy Synod. Concupiscence is left for our warfare (ad agonem); it cannot injure those who do not consent to it.… This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the Holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church never understood it to be called sin as being a true and properly so-called sin in the regenerated, but as being caused by sin and as inclining to sin. If any one holdeth the contrary, let him be anathema.”

II. The many erroneous notions of the nature of inherited sin arise, in general, from not giving due attention to the organic unity of its two elements, viz. the guilt contracted by the whole race in Adam, and the internal disorder of our nature which is the subject-matter of that guilt. By separating the formal from the material element, or by giving undue prominence to either of them, many notions of original sin have been formed, some quite heretical, some doubtful, some reconcilable with Catholic teaching. The space at our disposal only allows us to sketch out what appears to us the deepest, most complete, and most Catholic theory. We follow, in the main, St. Thomas (1 2, q. 82).

III. The mean between the two extreme theories conceives original sin so that its subject-matter is the internal disorder arising in the soul from the privation of due sanctity and justice, and its formal element the guilt or culpability contracted by man in Adam, for which man is still held responsible. Thus we can define original sin as “the culpable privation of original justice.” This definition distinguishes it from every other habitual sin, and points out, in its subject-matter, that element which accounts for all internal disorders consequent upon it. All theologians are bound to admit, with the Church, that the loss of sanctifying grace, or the death of the soul, is a constituent element of original sin; yet, as this loss of grace is an effect common to all mortal sins, it cannot be the “specific” subject-matter of original sin; something more must be added in order to distinguish this sin from all other sins. At this point theologians cease to agree. They shape their opinions in accordance with their notions of original justice.

IV. The Thomistic theory starts from the patristic view that sanctifying grace is the essential element of original (or hereditary) justice, and the root of the integrity of natural, as well as of supernatural, life. Hence (1) the radical element of injustice in original sin is to be sought in the essence of the soul, viz. in the culpable privation of sanctifying grace as root of the whole justice required of man by God. (2) In the second place, and effectively (with regard to its effects), the element of injustice appears in all the faculties of the soul bearing upon morality, as privation of the order willed and originally instituted by God. Hence original injustice, as opposed to original justice, comprises the absence of sanctity from the superior will, the want of subordination of the inferior will and sensuality to the superior will or reason. These, again, entail in the superior will an absolute impossibility to serve God supernaturally; a moral impossibility of observing even natural law in its entirety and permanently, and lastly another absolute impossibility of preventing all unholy God-displeasing motions. (3) Comparing original with actual sin, we find the “aversion from God” in the want of sanctity, especially of charity, and the “conversion to the creature” in the motions of concupiscence caused by the loss of original integrity. There is, however, a difference: in original sin the aversion from God is not, as in actual sin, essentially connected with the conversion to the creature. (4) Lastly, compared to a fully formed and developed actual sin in man, original sin consists in a tendency to inordinate motions, extending from the highest faculties of the soul to the organism of the body; all such motions participating in the character of formal sin as being the consequence of a culpable disorder in the innermost part of nature.

V. Original sin is exactly the same in all men, though the effects arising out of it, especially the infirmity of reason and the fervour of concupiscence, vary greatly in different individuals on account of the diversity of individual organization. Original sin in Adam’s posterity essentially differs from Adam’s own sin, because it does not include the same personal responsibility for an actual offence and contempt of God. Hence its peculiar position midway between mortal and venial sin. As it includes no personal act of free will it is, subjectively, the least of all sins, smaller even than semi-voluntary venial sins; but, objectively, or as regards its subject-matter, and especially the evils caused by it, it is a greater sin than most mortal sins. Again, original sin is free from that continued contempt or neglect of God which keeps the guilt of actual sin alive in the soul, and therefore, in this respect also, it is less than the least personal venial sin. These differences are summed up in the formula: “Original sin does not, like personal sins, imply an aversion from God as man’s natural end, but only an aversion from God as man’s supernatural end.”

VI. As all the individual members of the human race descend from Adam by way of generation, it is also by way of generation that they contract original sin. Christ, not being “born of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man” (John 1:12), even had He not been the Son of God, would not have been stained by original sin. The act of generation, however, is only instrumental in propagating sin. The principal cause is “the originating sin of Adam.” The act of generation prepares and determines the subject upon which the sin of nature exercises its deteriorating influence, and its connection with the transmission of original sin extends no farther. The personal sanctity of the parent does not prevent his offspring from contracting the stain of sin: for it is nature as corrupted in Adam that he propagates, and not his own nature as modified by his personal acts. The dispensation under which personal justice was hereditary came to an end in Adam himself; in the present dispensation, Christ alone possesses grace and the power of communicating it.

VII. Many Theologians explain the transmission of original sin by generation without taking into account the present inner condition of the parent. They establish between parent and offspring a merely moral and juridical relation, so that the progeny contracts certain obligations and liabilities of the progenitor by the fact of being born of him; in their system the transmission bears no inner analogy to the natural transmission of physical evils. St. Augustine, however, and the earlier Schoolmen, constantly make use of physical analogies to explain the propagation of original sin, and expressly describe it as caused by an imperfection (vitium) in the act of generation and in the progenitor, viz. the “ardour of concupiscence.” The explanation given by the best Schoolmen may be summarized as follows: the progenitor, according to the original Divine dispensation, ought to possess the power of generating a nature endowed with sanctity and justice. The absence of this power constitutes an imperfection of, or vitiates, the generative principles. Further, in the original state, the power to generate, in co-operation with the Holy Ghost, a perfect child of God, was specially bound up with the integrity of human nature; the perfect subjection of the members to the mind gave to the generative organism a purity fitting it for the co-operation of the Holy Ghost. Hence, e converso, the incapacity of generating a perfect child of God is likewise bound up with the loss of integrity, and more especially with the insubordination of the generative appetite, the Holy Ghost not having, since the Fall, co-operated with the generative act to the extent of remitting original sin in the offspring. Thus the imperfection (vitium) of the power and act of generation is not accidental or external, but internal, and in a certain sense natural; and it can be said with truth that “the concupiscence of the progenitor causes the progeny to be deprived of sanctity and justice.” The concupiscence in question is habitual concupiscence, of which the actual disorders accompanying the act of generation are but a sign. And habitual concupiscence itself produces original sin as a “deficient,” rather than as an “efficient” cause, much in the same way as free will causes sin, through the “deficiency” of its intention.

VIII. To complete the theory on the propagation of original sin by generation, we must show how the soul, though directly created by God, becomes infected with sin. St. Augustine hesitates between two explanations: either, he says, both body and soul are produced in a vitiated condition by the progenitor, or the soul is vitiated by its conjunction with a vitiated body (Contra Jul., 1. v. c. iv.). Since Creationism (cf. § 129) is now generally held, the first of these alternatives must be rejected. The second, if rightly understood, explains the difficulty in a way which is neither too grossly physical nor too superficially moral. The body inflicts no physical damage on the soul, but merely entangles it in the guiltiness of the seed of Adam. The flesh, disordered by the loss of original justice, being the recipient of the soul, the soul is received in a disordered manner, and becomes guilty by implication or infection. The corruption or aggravation of the soul by the body, on which St. Augustine and others so often insist, must be reduced to signify “that the union of body and soul into one nature makes the quality of the soul dependent on the quality of the body.” As shown in Book III., § 133, the soul, without a counteracting Divine influence, is subject to be impeded in its spiritual operations by the influence of the animal life of the body. But that Divine influence is now excluded from the beginning, because, as explained above, in the act of generation the Holy Ghost does not co-operate to the remission of original sin. Hence the soul, through its conjunction with the body, is deprived of a perfection, viz. the free development of its spiritual energy, which it would enjoy if it existed separately, or in the state of original integrity; in other words, it is “corrupted and weighed down” by the body. Let us here point out the different progress of corruption in Adam and in his posterity. In Adam the person corrupted the nature; first he lost sanctifying grace; then this loss entailed the loss of integrity, and infected his whole nature. In his descendants, on the contrary, nature infects the person; the corruption begins with the act of c generation, reaches the privileges of integrity, and ends in depriving the soul of sanctifying grace.

Another and more direct solution of the same difficulty may be based upon “the relation of principle between the soul of the progenitor and the soul of the progeny” (Book III., § 129, III.), which consists in this, that the father determines the production of the son as an image of himself in an organism derived from his own. This metaphysical relation of soul to soul is the foundation of all juridical and moral relations between father and son; and as a relation of soul to soul, it is particularly well adapted to serve as a foundation for the transmission of supernatural life, or of the nobility of adoptive sonship. Having forfeited his nobility, Adam could procreate only an ignoble image of himself—a child deprived of sanctifying grace and integrity, and the prey of concupiscence. The Council of Trent seems to hint at this notion when it makes the loss of sanctity the fundamental element of the loss of due justice not only in Adam, but also in his progeny (Sess. v. can. 2).

IX. The Pelagians used to urge that either God or the parents, or both, commit a sin if they give existence to a sinful soul. But the creative act of God, and the procreative act of the parents, directly intend the production of a new person, which is a good object, although the new being is accidentally subject to sin. Generation would be unlawful, indeed, if sin consisted in an inclination to evil, or if the inclination was irresistible; but such is not the case, especially since God has provided sufficient means of resistance.