Sect. 112Simultaneous Beginning of the World and of TimeSimultaneous Beginning of the World and of Time
I. Holy Scripture implies throughout, and explicitly states over and over again, that all things created have a beginning in time. When the world was first called into being time was not yet, because there existed nothing capable of undergoing change. Hence time and the world began at the same moment; or, “the world was created in the beginning of time,” as it is usually expressed in the language of the Church; “God, at the very beginning of time, made both kinds of creatures” (Vat. Council, sess. iii., c. 1). Thus the formula “production out of nothing” has the twofold meaning, “Things not existing of themselves receive existence,” and “things not yet existing or not existing before, begin to be.” Holy Scripture points out the temporal beginning of the world, especially in order to contrast it with the eternity of God, of the Word of God, and of the election by grace. E.g. Ps. 89:9; John 17:5; Eph. 1:4. “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1); that is, the Word was before things began to be (cf. Prov. 8:22). In the narrative of Creation, Gen. 1:1, the words “in the beginning” evidently mean the very beginning of time. This meaning is an obvious one; it fits in with the context; it is admissible and is often insinuated in other texts, e.g. John 1:1.
II. If the World came into being with time, the external efficacy of the Divine act which caused it to be, had likewise a beginning. From this, however, it does not follow that the creative act itself, as it is in God, had a beginning. The creative act, considered as existing in God, is nothing but the Divine decree to call the world into existence. This act is necessarily eternal, because it is part of the Divine Life; but it is also an act of the free Will of God, and therefore God is absolutely free to fix a time for its realization.
III. To defend the Catholic dogma that, as a matter of fact, the world had a beginning, it is certainly not necessary to demonstrate the impossibility of the opposite opinion. It is enough to show that a beginning in time is possible, and that the necessity of eternal existence cannot be proved. These two propositions are evident; for, if a thing does not exist necessarily, still less does it necessarily exist always; and God, in Whose power it is to determine all the conditions under which His works are to exist, can evidently determine a time for the beginning of their existence.
IV. Can our reason conceive a creation from all eternity? As the Catholic dogma just stated remains intact whichever way this vexed question be answered, we leave it to the disputations of philosophers. The reader will find it amply debated in St. Thomas, I., q. 46, art. 1, Contra Gentes, l. ii., c. 31, sqq.; De Pot., q. iii., a. 17; Capreolus in I Sent., d. i.; Cajetan in I., q. 46, a. 2; Estius in 2 Sent., d. i., § 11. These maintain the possibility of eternal creation. The following deny it: Albertus Magnus, Henry of Ghent, and most modern theologians. Greg, of Valentia, in I., disp. iii., q. 2, proposes an intermediate opinion.
I. Holy Scripture implies throughout, and explicitly states over and over again, that all things created have a beginning in time. When the world was first called into being time was not yet, because there existed nothing capable of undergoing change. Hence time and the world began at the same moment; or, “the world was created in the beginning of time,” as it is usually expressed in the language of the Church; “God, at the very beginning of time, made both kinds of creatures” (Vat. Council, sess. iii., c. 1). Thus the formula “production out of nothing” has the twofold meaning, “Things not existing of themselves receive existence,” and “things not yet existing or not existing before, begin to be.” Holy Scripture points out the temporal beginning of the world, especially in order to contrast it with the eternity of God, of the Word of God, and of the election by grace. E.g. Ps. 89:9; John 17:5; Eph. 1:4. “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1); that is, the Word was before things began to be (cf. Prov. 8:22). In the narrative of Creation, Gen. 1:1, the words “in the beginning” evidently mean the very beginning of time. This meaning is an obvious one; it fits in with the context; it is admissible and is often insinuated in other texts, e.g. John 1:1.
II. If the World came into being with time, the external efficacy of the Divine act which caused it to be, had likewise a beginning. From this, however, it does not follow that the creative act itself, as it is in God, had a beginning. The creative act, considered as existing in God, is nothing but the Divine decree to call the world into existence. This act is necessarily eternal, because it is part of the Divine Life; but it is also an act of the free Will of God, and therefore God is absolutely free to fix a time for its realization.
III. To defend the Catholic dogma that, as a matter of fact, the world had a beginning, it is certainly not necessary to demonstrate the impossibility of the opposite opinion. It is enough to show that a beginning in time is possible, and that the necessity of eternal existence cannot be proved. These two propositions are evident; for, if a thing does not exist necessarily, still less does it necessarily exist always; and God, in Whose power it is to determine all the conditions under which His works are to exist, can evidently determine a time for the beginning of their existence.
IV. Can our reason conceive a creation from all eternity? As the Catholic dogma just stated remains intact whichever way this vexed question be answered, we leave it to the disputations of philosophers. The reader will find it amply debated in St. Thomas, I., q. 46, art. 1, Contra Gentes, l. ii., c. 31, sqq.; De Pot., q. iii., a. 17; Capreolus in I Sent., d. i.; Cajetan in I., q. 46, a. 2; Estius in 2 Sent., d. i., § 11. These maintain the possibility of eternal creation. The following deny it: Albertus Magnus, Henry of Ghent, and most modern theologians. Greg, of Valentia, in I., disp. iii., q. 2, proposes an intermediate opinion.
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